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1 Introduction
Since 1979, the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) has represented the cor-
nerstone of monetary policy strategies in Europe, and the most ambitious
experiment in international monetary and exchange rate cooperation of the
post-Bretton Woods era. The nature of the ERM has not remained un-
changed over time. Originally intended as a system of …xed but (frequently)
adjustable rates with limited international capital mobility, it was only in the
second half of the 1980s that the ERM became the “hard” ERM , a regime
of stable and narrow currency bands defended by coordinated intervention
among central banks, virtually without exchange controls.
Until the fall of 1992, the satisfactory performance of the new ERM was
a key factor underlying the general appeal of a further transformation of
the system toward complete monetary harmonization, and eventual uni…ca-
tion. Starting in early 1992, however, a sequence of adverse developments of
increasing severity undermined the whole process towards European Mone-
tary Union (EMU). The crisis and revamping of the ERM between 1992 and
1993 represents the key event in the recent monetary history of Europe —
one whose origins, consequences and implications are still at the core of the
current academic and political debate, both in Europe and elsewhere.
The literature has provided several complementary interpretations of the
ERM crisis. Possibly the most popular one is based on the policy con‡ict
stemming from the internal reuni…cation process in Germany and the policy
mix adopted in that country during the early 1990s. Other explanations of
the collapse in terms of the behavior of fundamentals focus on persistent
divergent performances of national price or unit cost levels — presumably
re‡ecting divergent national monetary and …scal policies during the “hard”
ERM years —; the liberalization of international …nancial capital movements
under the Single Act; and the perceived change in national policy-makers’
commitment to …xed exchange rates after the results of the …rst Danish ref-
erendum in June 1992. Finally, the role of self-ful…lling speculative attacks,
triggered by sudden, and essentially arbitrary, expectations shifts in the …-
nancial markets, has been emphasized in recent interpretations of the collapse
of the ERM.
In the present stage of international debate on EMU, when European
policy makers are about to give shape to the future by (one hopes) drawing
lessons from the experience of the past, an incorrect or even just incomplete
interpretation of the 1992-93 events may be socially, and politically, costly.
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Do the existing theories, individually or collectively, o¤er a reasonable picture
of the ERM crisis and point to a su¢ciently comprehensive list of factors to
be taken into account?
In our view, most interpretations of the 1992-93 events miss the following
crucial element: the ERM crisis has been the crisis of an exchange rate sys-
tem, rather than the collapse of a collection of unilateral pegs individually
pursued by a number of countries. The existing interpretive schemes typically
focus on the adjustment problem of a representative country, facing an exoge-
nous shock that undermines the stability of the current exchange rate parity
against the center country. The thesis we develop in this contribution is that
the conclusions reached within such framework may be incomplete or mis-
leading, since they ignore the key role played by structural policy spillovers
among European countries, and overlook the e¤ects of coordination (or lack
thereof) of monetary and exchange rate policies among the countries making
up the periphery of the system. In contrast to an approach that focuses
exclusively on country-speci…c issues, we argue that a systemic view is ulti-
mately able to unravel more coherently, and more convincingly, the “puzzles”
of the ERM crisis.
The paper is structured in three parts. The …rst part (Section 2) presents
an overview of the analysis, summarizing our main results. The second part
(Sections 3-5) is devoted to an analytical review of the current theoretical
literature, focusing on the role of domestic credibility in a unilateral peg
framework. The international dimensions of the equilibria, and their im-
plications for the European events, are explored in the third part (Sections
6-9).
Section 3 provides a simple analytical framework, able to encompass —
both technically and intellectually — the recent literature on currency crises,
while developing it by bringing out the decisive role of the strategic inter-
actions among national policy makers in a multi-country monetary and ex-
change rate game. Section 4 characterizes the domestic equilibrium on a
theoretical level, while the following section uses our results to review several
interpretations of the ERM crisis.
Sections 6 through 9 develop the analysis of an exchange rate system
crisis as an international policy game. Section 6 describes the international
dimension of the non-cooperative (Nash) equilibrium. The alternative to
Nash is cooperation, restricted in a way that, in our view, captures the
relevant institutional and historical features of the ERM and is especially
suitable to describe the international policy con‡ict at the time of the crisis
(Section 7). Section 8 compares cooperative and Nash equilibria and provides
an assessment of the role of policy coordination in a currency crisis. Section 9
interprets the 1992-93 crisis in the framework of our Center-Periphery model.
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A …nal section recapitulates the main issues raised in the paper, drawing some
lessons for the current debate on the monetary future of Europe.
2 An overview of the analysis
2.1 Theory...
It is helpful to anticipate and synthesize in an opening section the main
features of our theoretical framework. We model the ERM as a system con-
sisting of a set of Periphery countries that peg their currencies against the
currency of the price-stabilizing Center country. Our construction conforms
to the ‘consensus’ view (at the time of the crisis) of the ERM as a disin‡a-
tion mechanism, where the exchange rate against the D-mark is the nominal
anchor for Periphery countries.
In our model, the Center has an uncompromising attitude towards its
own price stability goal, and the policy-makers’ objective function exhibits
no in‡ationary bias. These characteristics qualify the Center as the nat-
ural candidate to receive the mandate of guaranteeing price stability (but
not necessarily monetary stability) in the system. Conversely, the in‡ation-
prone Periphery countries consider …xed exchange rates as an intermediate
target toward price stability. However, policy-makers’ commitment in the
Periphery is only imperfectly credible, and market participants perceive the
abandonment of the peg as a possible policy option in the presence of external
shocks.
With the German uni…cation scenario in mind, we assume that the source
of tension in the system is a large, asymmetric disturbance in the form of a
demand (e.g., ‘IS’) shock in the Center, generating pressures for an e¤ective
real appreciation of the currency of this country. In such a situation, the
Periphery as a whole would bene…t from a monetary expansion by the Center,
which would absorb at least part of the domestic demand surge and lower
interest rates in the system. However, the resulting level of internal in‡ation
would be unacceptable to the authorities in the Center. The Center would
of course bene…t from a realignment in the system, that would o¤set the
original demand shock, but a realignment would entail high reputation and
credibility costs for the policy makers in the Periphery countries.
Even though the monetary authorities of the Center are unwilling to
jeopardize their internal nominal targets by cooperating with the Periph-
ery, Periphery countries have a welfare incentive to coordinate their mone-
tary policies among themselves, internalizing their reciprocal spillovers (that
is, the impact of domestic policies on other Periphery countries’ in‡ation
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and employment). Coordination, however, requires an e¤ective enforcement
mechanism (to prevent unilateral deviations from the agreement) that may
not be available to the Periphery. Also, there may be lack of consensus and
agreement on how the costs and bene…ts from Periphery-wide policies — such
as a generalized exchange rate realignment against the Center — should be
distributed among the individual Periphery countries.
In addressing the issue of feasibility of intra-Periphery cooperation, we
argue that, based on the European experience, special weight should be given
to a principle of national horizontal equity. The principle states that national
authorities accept to cooperate only to the extent that no country would
excessively bene…t or lose from the common policy more — in relative terms
— than the others. A national horizontal equity constraint thus implies that
no country is willing either to bear a disproportionate share of the costs of a
coordinated realignment, or to accept an unfair distribution of its bene…ts,
even when the corresponding exchange rate policy would be e¢cient for the
system as a whole.
Of course, national horizontal equity is, in principle, consistent with a very
large set of Community-wide policy decisions — and realignment schemes,
— provided countries can use appropriate side-payments to compensate the
losers (if only in relative terms) from such decisions. However, international
transfers contingent on asymmetric realignments with selective devaluations
tend to be politically questionable, and di¢cult to implement. It does not
come as a surprise that, in the history of the ERM, there is no evidence
that they ever represented an institutional reality. Thus, in our model, while
postulating national horizontal equity, we also rule out side-payments among
countries.
We consider two scenarios characterizing the possible policy responses of
the Periphery countries to the Center demand shock. In the …rst scenario,
Periphery countries coordinate their exchange rate policies – subject to a
national horizontal equity constraint without side-payments – so as to max-
imize a common social welfare function. In the alternative scenario, there is
no cooperation, and each country unilaterally maximizes its own objective
function.
Our model shows that, given a realistic hypothesis about the sign of in-
ternational policy spillovers (expansionary monetary policy in any Periphery
country contributes to lower real interest rates in the system as a whole, and
causes a real appreciation of the currencies of all other Periphery countries),
the optimal coordinated response by the Periphery is a set of small devalua-
tions by a large number of countries. If, instead, the Periphery countries do
not coordinate their monetary and exchange rate policies against the Center,
we will observe large devaluations by a small number of countries. In the
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aggregate, coordinated exchange rate policy is generally more expansionary
for the system as a whole than uncoordinated policy actions.
The intuition underlying these results is rooted in the international spillovers
of domestic monetary policy. The devaluation of one country (say, Italy) af-
fects the other Periphery countries through two channels. First, a fall in the
price of imports from Italy decreases CPI in‡ation in the rest of the sys-
tem. Second, by devaluing, Italy contributes to a loosening of the stance of
ERM-wide monetary policy, decreasing the interest rate in real terms and
therefore boosting aggregate demand and employment in the system. In the
presence of such spillovers, if a coordinated policy response requires a re-
alignment of the Periphery as a whole vis-à-vis the Center, the magnitude
of the realignment will be increasing in the magnitude of the externality:
with positive externalities, monetary cooperation calls for “doing more” as
regards exchange rate policy.
From the vantage point of each single Periphery country, however, “doing
more” does not translate into a large devaluation of its currency against
the Center. In fact, because of the national horizontal equity constraint
(the expression of the requirement of political fairness in the Periphery), the
coordinated response would likely consist of a realignment scheme including
many currencies. Given the strong impact that such a joint devaluation
has on interest rates, the individual devaluation rate need not be high for
domestic stabilization purposes.
Conversely, in a scenario without cooperation, provided that some coun-
tries devalue and therefore lower the real interest rates in the system, some
other countries may avoid a realignment altogether. In equilibrium, the av-
erage monetary stance is less expansionary than in the coordinated scenario,
because the subset of the devaluing countries has only a limited impact on
the system-wide equilibrium real interest rate. Nonetheless, for this very
reason, if a country abandons the peg its individual devaluation rate turns
out to be “excessively” high.
2.2 ... and policy
What is the contribution of a systemic model of currency crises to the under-
standing of the 1992-93 events? Consider again the explanation stressing the
role of the German uni…cation shock. According to this view, the ERM crisis
stems from the con‡ict between a Center-country that is unwilling to bear
the in‡ationary consequences of the uni…cation, and the Periphery-countries
that dislike the idea of a nominal realignment but are not willing to sustain
the costs of a de‡ation. It is worth pointing out that such a policy con‡ict
was apparent on several occasions, an important example being the European
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meeting at Bath, on September 5 and 6, 1992.1
Taking this con‡ict as a datum, our analysis picks up from where the
other contributions in the literature generally stop. By itself, in fact, the
identi…cation of an important source of tensions calling into question the
existing ERM parities does not tell us much about the likely modalities of
adjustment of these parities. To clarify this point, recall that, in our analysis,
the optimal coordinated response by the Periphery to the aggregate demand
shock in the Center country is a set of small devaluations by a large number
of Periphery countries. Indeed, during the weekend preceding the Lira de-
valuation, Germany and Italy formulated a realignment scheme that entailed
a generalized, small realignment of all ERM currencies against the D-mark:
the scheme had a D-mark nominal revaluation by 3.5%, coupled with a 3.5%
devaluation of the lira – so that the lira would have been devalued by 7%
against the D-mark.
If …nancial agents believed that the Periphery countries acted coopera-
tively, their expectations would be based on the forecasted generalized, small
realignments. Empirical evidence supports this theoretical prediction: al-
though the credibility of the ERM was falling in August 1992, all indicators
of devaluation expectations — such as interest rate di¤erentials, forward pre-
miums, and average forecasts based on survey data — were by no means large
by historical standards.
In our interpretation, the realignment on September 14, 1992, gave the
private sector a strong signal about the degree of policy coordination in the
system. In our view, it was the devaluation of the lira (or, rather, the fact
that it was only the lira that was devalued that day) that revealed to the
markets what kind of strategic game the Central Banks were playing. What
had been thought of as an international monetary system, turned out to
be nothing more than a collection of individual, unilateral pegs against the
D-mark.
What are the implications for the behavior of private markets? Once
again, recall that restoring equilibrium without coordination requires large
devaluations by a subset of countries. Presumably, in the absence of cooper-
ation, the equilibrium depreciation of the lira should have been higher than
the initial 7% implemented on September 14, 1992: in fact, 7% was the same
…gure that had been proposed in the context of a general realignment two
days earlier, which would have had all countries joining Italy in devaluing
their currencies. Also, there was a legitimate question as to whether other
countries should also have devalued in the new non-cooperative equilibrium.
As market participants analyzed the implications of the new policy scenar-
ios, many currencies must have appeared as potential candidates to sizable,
non-cooperative devaluations. In our theoretical model, while the number
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of countries involved in a non-cooperative realignment is well de…ned, which
countries devalue cannot be determined. The 1992-93 waves of speculative at-
tacks in Europe, apparently regardless of the performance of macroeconomic
fundamentals across countries, were the logical outcome of such conclusions.
Could have the ERM been saved by a joint devaluation, implementing
some scheme similar to the German-Italian proposal? Our model points
out the possibility that no coordinated realignment might have been polit-
ically acceptable under the national horizontal equity constraint. In other
words, it is possible that there existed no common realignment scheme that
would have compensated for the common loss of anti-in‡ationary credibility.
Under these circumstances, countries could have only “coordinated” on a
painfully de‡ationary defense of the existing parities. Clearly, insofar as un-
coordinated behavior loosens up the average monetary policy in the system
(through large, uncoordinated devaluations by a few Periphery countries),
it is both individually and collectively rational to switch from (constrained)
cooperation to non-cooperation.
The model o¤ers an analytical key to interpret the evolution of European
exchange rates from September 1992 onward, provided we de…ne the Center
to include both Germany and other countries, like the Netherlands, that have
long delegated their monetary policies to Germany. Possibly, in the period
under consideration, France has acquired the special position of belonging to
the (soft) “Core” of the system: a country subject to large-scale speculative
attacks, like the rest of the Periphery, but not succumbing to them, thanks
to many episodes of strong and e¤ective monetary cooperation (and massive
support from Germany). Outside the “Core”, the exit of the lira and the
pound from the ERM, recurrent speculative attacks and devaluations since
September 1992 were to a large extent the re‡ection of each country’s attempt
to restore macroeconomic equilibrium in a new European Monetary System
(EMS) su¤ering from the loss of its systemic structure and nature.
3 A Center-Periphery model of currency crises
3.1 An introduction to the model
The interpretation summarized above is based on a general model of cur-
rency crises in a multi-country setup. To emphasize both links with and
departures from the existing literature, we cast our analysis within the fa-
miliar framework of an international monetary policy game, adopting its
standard conventions.2 We believe that the novelty of our approach, namely
a systemic analysis highlighting the role played by international spillovers
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and strategic policy interactions, is more likely to stand out when presented
against a familiar background.
Notably, in specifying our model, we adopt the view according to which
a …xed exchange rate policy facilitates the process of domestic disin‡ation
and helps strengthen the reputation of the domestic policy, by “importing”
credibility from the center. Needless to say, in the post-crisis literature the
idea of any e¤ectiveness of the ERM as a ‘commitment technology’ has met
with increasing skepticism. Yet, from the mid-Eighties until the 1992-93
crisis, the anti-in‡ationary discipline of an exchange rate peg as a nominal
anchor has provided the most common economic argument in favor of the
ERM.3 To the extent that it captures the conventional view of the ERM
shared by both public and private agents in the months preceding the crisis,
such an approach provides the appropriate setup with which to analyze the
formation of market expectations, as well as to interpret the unfolding of the
1992-93 events.
In our framework, the economy consists of N + 1 countries, the …rst N
of which represent the Periphery of the system, while the last is the Center.
All countries in the system are symmetric as regards technology and private
sector decision rules, including those characterizing labor market behavior.
However, there are crucial macroeconomic dissimilarities between Center and
Periphery; speci…cally, the Center has three unique characteristics. First, it
provides a nominal anchor for the system as a whole by targeting the level,
rather than the rate of growth, of the price level. Second, there is no dis-
crepancy between the target level of output and potential (full-employment)
output, so that no in‡ationary bias (à-la-Kydland-Prescott/Barro-Gordon)
a¤ects its economy in a time-consistent equilibrium. Third, it is assumed that
all countries in the Periphery trade real goods and services exclusively with
the Center, that is, intra-Periphery trade is negligible. No such restriction is
imposed on trade in …nancial claims.
At a …rst sight, the third assumption may appear very unrealistic; af-
ter all, concerns with the competitive gap within the Periphery have been
frequently raised by national policy-makers and by both import-competing
and exporting sectors in Europe since the inception of the ERM, a¤ecting
the determination of Community-wide exchange rate policies.4 However, the
assumption simply allows us to omit algebra-intensive but inessential con-
siderations: the results we would obtain in a more complex setup would
not signi…cantly alter the conclusions reached within our framework. For
instance, one of the properties of our model is that a devaluation in a given
Periphery country shifts global demand towards the country’s products and
causes a real appreciation in all other Periphery countries, the same qualita-
tive result we would obtain in a model focusing directly on intra-Periphery
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competitiveness.
In contrast to the Center, in the Periphery there is an in‡ationary bias
in policy making. Due to the presence of such a bias, Periphery countries
choose to reduce the scope for discretion in monetary policy by pegging their
exchange rates against the currency of the Center. Such a policy would
obviously be time-inconsistent, unless reneging on the commitment to main-
tain the announced exchange rate peg entails a loss of utility for the policy
maker: the higher the opportunity cost of switching to a ‡oat, the higher the
reliability of the commitment to a …xed exchange rate regime.
Our theoretical construction hinges on the impact of global shocks orig-
inating in the Center on the performance and the policies of the Periphery
countries. Therefore, the only source of (exogenous) uncertainty that is ex-
plicitly modeled is an aggregate demand shock in the Center country — the
German uni…cation shock. The emphasis on such a source of uncertainty is
motivated by the stylized facts preceding the collapse of the ERM, in partic-
ular the demand boom associated with German uni…cation. Nonetheless, our
setup could be easily extended to encompass currency substitution shocks or
supply-side productivity disturbances.
3.2 The structure of the economy
The structure of the economy closely follows the literature on international
policy games.5 As the main features of our setup are well known, in what fol-
lows we will exclusively focus on a semi-reduced form of the model; a detailed
description of the structural characteristics of the economy is presented in
Appendix A-D. As regards notation, all variables other than interest rates are
in natural logarithms. All Center variables are starred, while the Periphery
countries are indexed with a subscript i, for i = 1; 2; :::; N. Unless other-
wise explicitly stated, Greek letters (both lowercase and uppercase) refer to
constant, positive parameters.
The …rst two equations of the model describe the levels of employment
and CPI in the i¡ th Periphery country:
ni;t =
1
®2
[si;t ¡ wi;t + p¤t ¡ Ài;t] (1)
qi;t = ®0ni;t +wi;t + ¯Ài;t (2)
where ni;t is the level of employment in the i¡ th Periphery country at time
t; si;t is the nominal exchange rate (domestic currency per unit of Center
currency); wi;t is the domestic nominal wage prevailing at time t; qi;t is the
domestic CPI in country i; p¤t is the GDP de‡ator in the Center country.
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Last, the variable Ài;t is a country-speci…c shock, whose characteristics will
be analyzed below in detail.
The interpretation of these equation is straightforward. Consider expres-
sion (1) …rst. For given nominal wages, employment is increasing in the
nominal exchange rate, as this implies a higher rate of monetary expansion
and lower real wages. For a given exchange rate, employment is decreasing
in the level of nominal wage, as this reduces domestic competitiveness. Ce-
teris paribus, employment and output increase with a monetary expansion in
the Center which raises p¤t , boosting the demand for the Periphery countries’
exports. In expression (2), the in‡ationary impact of a surge in domestic
employment and a rise in nominal wages is self-explanatory.6
In the class of models under consideration, the timing of the decisions is
the following. First, the money wage rate wi;t is set, before the shock and
the response of the domestic central bank are observed by private agents.
Wages are not renegotiated after the money supply is announced. Thus,
wage contracts prevailing at time t are based on information available at time
t¡ 1 : the economy is characterized by short-run (one-period) nominal wage
rigidities. Second, the shock Ài;t is observed and the central bank chooses
the level of the domestic money supply. Under standard assumptions,7 the
rational-expectation wage rate is equal to the expected money supply
wi;t = Et¡1mi;t (3)
(where Et¡1 denotes the expectation operator conditional on information
available at time t¡ 1) and the level of employment is equal to the domestic
monetary innovation
ni;t =mi;t ¡ Et¡1mi;t (4)
Thus, for given wages, the semi-reduced form for the employment level is
also a semi-reduced form for money supply. Also, the domestic de‡ator pi;t
is equal to
pi;t = wi;t + ®ni;t = (1 ¡ ®)Et¡1mi;t + ®mi;t (5)
We can now provide a discussion of the domestic disturbance term Ài;t. As
shown in Appendix D, the country-speci…c shock includes two components:
Ài;t ´ ²t ¡
0@®1 X
j 6=i
nj;t + Án¤t
1A (6)
The …rst component, indexed by ²t; a¤ects all Periphery countries symmet-
rically, as it depends on current and future anticipated disturbances to the
aggregate demand of the Center country (e.g., the ‘IS’ shock).8 The second
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component of the country-speci…c shock (in brackets) depends – with a neg-
ative sign – on the monetary innovations (i.e. on the employment levels) of
all the other countries in the system.
Intuitively, in equilibrium an increase in demand for the Center’s output
requires, ceteris paribus, a real e¤ective appreciation of the Center’s currency
against the Periphery. This can be achieved through (a) domestic in‡ation
in the Center, (b) an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate of the Center
against the Periphery, or (c) a generalized de‡ation in the Periphery. Under
option (a), the demand boom in the Center would be absorbed internally
and would not have signi…cant consequences in the Periphery: heuristically,
the changes in ²t and n¤t would o¤set each other in equation (6), leaving Ài;t
una¤ected everywhere in the Periphery.
If the Center is unwilling to tolerate the in‡ationary consequences of the
internal demand boom, the shock is transmitted to the Periphery. Consider
…rst the case in which the Periphery consists of one country only. Equation
(2) shows that, for any given domestic monetary policy in the Periphery
country (and thus, for any employment and GDP de‡ator level), the IS
shock in the Center unambiguously leads to in‡ation in the Periphery. The
mechanism is well known. As the demand boom in the Center raises the
interest rates in the Center, capitals ‡ow from the Periphery to the Center.
If the monetary authorities in the Periphery do not react to the fall in the
demand for domestic currency, the equilibrium exchange rate depreciates in
both nominal and real terms against the Center, and the CPI level in the
Periphery increases (option b). However, the monetary authorities of the
Periphery country can also accommodate the shock by decreasing its money
supply and defending the exchange rate parity. The defense of the peg, as
shown by eqn.(1), has a recessionary impact on the domestic economy (option
c).
In the general case of N > 1 Periphery countries, eqn.(6) makes clear that
— from the vantage point of each individual Periphery country — the impact
of the shock originating in the Center depends not only on the policy response
of the Center itself, but also on the monetary behavior of the rest of the
Periphery. In other words, while the relevant shock Ài;t is always “country-
speci…c”, it re‡ects the behavior of all the other countries in the system. If ®1
is positive — as we discuss below —, the role played by a monetary expansion
in the rest of the Periphery is somewhat analogous to the role played by a
monetary expansion in the Center. By bringing the e¤ective terms of trade
of the Center closer to its equilibrium level, an expansion somewhere in the
Periphery represents a “shock-absorber” for the rest of the system.9
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3.3 Social welfare and commitment technology
The loss function of the policy maker in the i¡th Periphery country is de…ned
as follows 1X
¿=0
Et`i;t+¿ (7)
where the single period loss function is
`i;t ´ 12
h
(ni;t ¡ ¹ni)2 + ¾(qi;t ¡ ¹qi;t)2
i
+ ciIi;t (8)
Ii;t =
(
0 if si;t = ¹si;t
1 otherwise (9)
qi;t = si;t + p
¤
t (10)
The single period loss function `i in (8) is quadratic in the deviation of actual
employment and CPI from their current target levels, ¹ni and ¹qi;t respectively.
The target level of employment exceeds the rational-expectations equilibrium
or “natural” level. As in this model the latter is normalized to zero, we have
¹ni > 0. Following the standard conventions, such a parametrization of the
model implies the presence of some exogenous (and unremovable) distortions
in the Periphery labor market, that make the full-employment output level
socially suboptimal. The well-known theoretical implication of the result-
ing con‡ict between public preferences and equilibrium constraints is that
an equilibrium with full monetary discretion leads to a Pareto-dominated
allocation, a¤ected by an in‡ationary bias.
The target levels for prices and employment, as well as the exchange rate
parity (indexed by ¹si;t) are known at time t¡ 1, before wages are set. The
target price level of the Periphery country (eqn.(10)) has two properties.
First, as long as the exchange rate peg is maintained, the Center’s price
level target ¹p¤t is also the Periphery’s price level target.10 Second, when the
peg is abandoned, there is ‘drift’ in the Periphery’s price level target: unlike
the Center,11 a Periphery country does not automatically try to recoup an
in‡ation disappointment.
The positive constant ci in eqn.(8) denotes some exogenously given welfare
cost of abandoning the peg: country i’s policy makers su¤er a welfare loss
equal to ci when the current exchange rate deviates (no matter by how much)
from the announced exchange rate parity. For our purposes, these costs are
best understood as a proxy for the wide array of non-quanti…able political
interests underlying the defense of a given exchange rate target, ranging from
naked national chauvinism to fears of professional loss of prestige, reputation
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and in‡uence; they may also re‡ect a widespread belief that exchange rate
stability is a public good in its own right, quite apart from its anti-in‡ationary
implications.
In our model, market participants take the existence of a commitment
technology as a datum: the higher the degree of commitment by the pol-
icy authority to the defense of the peg, the higher the lump-sum costs ci
that the policy authority will “pay” if it abandons its announced target. An
extremely high value of ci implies that, regardless of internal and external
circumstances, the policy authority will subordinate its other objectives to
the defense of the current exchange rate. A negligible value signals that gov-
ernments will always let the currency ‡oat or, equivalently, set it at the value
most conducive to the achievement of its other objectives. Intermediate val-
ues can be rationalized in terms of escape clauses allowing for the possibility
of realignments in the presence of speci…c contingencies, i.e. depending on
the size of the shock hitting the domestic economy (Obstfeld [1991]).
For the Center country we posit a one-period social loss in the following
form
`¤t ´ 12
h
(n¤t )
2 + ¾(p¤t )
2
i
(11)
In contrast to eqn.(8), note, …rst, that the Center country does not su¤er
from an in‡ationary bias (¹n¤t = 0); second, the price level target is constant
and normalized to zero (¹p¤t = 0), that is, in‡ation does not lead to a rebasing
of the price level target over time; third, the policy maker does not target
any exchange rate parity (there are no …xed costs of reneging on an exchange
rate commitment).
The Center country optimally (and credibly) pursues full employment
while setting the domestic de‡ator equal to zero in each period. It can be
easily veri…ed that the policy maker in the Center will be able to achieve a
social …rst best by following the monetary rule
m¤t = 0 (12)
that implies
n¤t = m
¤
t ¡ Et¡1m¤t = 0 (13)
in all periods. It also follows that p¤t = w¤t = 0.
It is worth emphasizing that, in our speci…cation, the loss function of
the Center includes the domestic GDP de‡ator instead of the domestic CPI
(that depends on the e¤ective real exchange rate against the Periphery),
so that there is no strategic interaction between Center and Periphery as a
whole. At a theoretical level, there is no compelling reason to introduce such
asymmetry between Center and Periphery.12 However, in our interpretation
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of the 1992-93 events, we want to emphasize how a systemic crisis is related
to the policy con‡ict within the Periphery, once the con‡ict between Center
and Periphery is frozen in non-cooperative behavior. To highlight this feature
of our setup, we cut the Gordian knot and choose to avoid any analysis of
the Center-Periphery interactions. It turns out that, while permitting us to
avoid a great deal of analytical complications, including the GDP de‡ator
in (11) instead of the CPI does not a¤ect the results of our analysis in any
substantive way.
3.4 International policy spillovers
As intra-Periphery externalities play a crucial role in our model, it is impor-
tant to analyze their nature and implications in detail. Consider a monetary
expansion in one Periphery country, indexed by j; which brings about a real
depreciation of its currency against the Center.13 The impact of such a mon-
etary expansion on the economy of another (any other) Periphery country,
indexed by i 6= j, can be split into two components of opposite sign, an
expenditure-switching and an expenditure-changing e¤ect.
These e¤ects are best understood starting from the equilibrium condition
in the goods market of the Center. Other things equal, a real depreciation of
the Periphery country j’s currency shifts demand in the Center away from
the goods produced either in the Center or in the rest of the Periphery (that
is, in any country i) and toward country j’s goods. This is the expenditure-
switching e¤ect associated with a monetary expansion in country j, which
lowers aggregate demand in the rest of the Periphery. However, as output
supply in the Center is unchanged, equilibrium requires a fall in the Center’s
real interest rate, r¤. Ceteris paribus, the fall of r¤ lowers the real interest
rate in all other countries and boosts demand for the Periphery’s output.
This is the expenditure-changing impact of a monetary expansion in country
j : it increases global demand by lowering the “world” interest rate.14
Thus, if the elasticity of the aggregate demand with respect to the real
exchange rate is large enough, the expenditure-changing e¤ect of a mone-
tary expansion by any one Periphery country prevails over the expenditure-
switching e¤ect: its real exchange rate appreciates and the real interest rate
falls in the rest of the Periphery. The spillovers associated with a monetary
expansion by one country may of course have the opposite sign. As is clear
from the expression for the country-speci…c shock (6), it is the parameter ®1
that determines the sign of the e¤ect of a monetary expansion in one country
on employment and price level elsewhere in the system:15 ®1 is positive if
and only if the expenditure-changing e¤ect prevails.
As well known, in the empirical literature there exists considerable dis-
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agreement on the sign and the size of international spillovers.16 However, in
the context of our study, there are compelling reasons to believe that the rel-
evant spillovers among the ERM countries best …t the pattern of a prevailing
expenditure-changing e¤ect. Ex-post, there are few doubts that the ERM
devaluations in 1992 substantially contributed to the rapid fall of interest
rates both in Germany and in the rest of the system (France and the UK
represent particularly spectacular cases) between 1992 and 1993. A striking
visual representation of this point is provided by Figure 1, that shows the
plot of short-term nominal and real interest rates in Germany in the 1990’s
(the spike in the graph corresponds to September 1992).
Insert Figure 1 here
To the extent that the impact of the “swing” of German interest rates on
the economies of the European Periphery is considered as the predominant
macroeconomic issue in the unfolding of the ERM events (the consensus
view), there is strong evidence in support of our assumption that, on balance,
the net e¤ect in the transmission of monetary policies in Europe was positive
(®1 > 0). It is worth noticing that this assumption does not rule out the
possibility of shifts in demand — from strong- to weak-currency countries’
goods — following a devaluation: rather, it de-emphasizes their relevance
vis-à-vis the impact of a system-wide fall in interest rates.
4 Non-cooperative equilibrium: the role of
domestic credibility
The analysis of the equilibrium begins with the determination of the optimal
monetary policy of a representative Periphery country. At any point in time,
the problem faced by the monetary authority of country i can be thought
of as a nested choice. First, the policy maker will determine whether to
maintain or abandon the peg, knowing that reneging on the commitment to
peg the currency brings about a reduction of utility by some …xed amount
ci. Second, contingent on the peg having been abandoned, the size of the
monetary expansion is chosen; given the positive relation between a country’s
money supply and its exchange rate, this translates into the determination
of the optimal size of the realignment. At the time when such decisions are
taken, the monetary authority of the Periphery country i takes into account
the following variables: the demand shock in the Center, ²t; the stance of
monetary policy in the rest of the system, that ism¤t andmj;t for all Periphery
countries j 6= i; and the wage level set in the domestic labor market wt.
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4.1 Characterizing the optimal monetary policy: the
shadow devaluation rate
The optimal policy rule for country i combines two di¤erent monetary regimes.
In one the money stock is consistent with the survival of the peg. In the other
one the peg is abandoned and the money supply optimally responds to funda-
mentals. Consider …rst the optimal monetary policy conditional on the peg
having been abandoned. If the current exchange rate parity is no longer a
binding target or constraint, the policy maker will minimize the loss function
`i;t by choosing a money supply such that
@`i;t
@mi;t
= nFLi;t ¡ ¹ni + ¾®0
³
qFLi;t ¡ ¹qi;t
´
= 0 (14)
where the superscript “FL” refers to “conditional on abandoning the peg”.17
If instead the policy maker decides to defend the current parity, the monetary
policy is implicitly determined by expression (1), positing si;t = ¹si;t:
nFXi;t ¡ ¹si;t ¡wi;t ¡ Ài;t®2 = 0 (15)
where the superscript “FX” refer to “conditional on defending the peg”.
As regards the choice of exchange rate (and monetary policy) regime, the
policy maker will opt for abandoning the peg if and only if the loss under
a peg is larger than the loss associated with a devaluation, including the
lump-sum welfare cost ci:
1
2
nh
(nFXi;t ¡ ¹ni)2 + ¾(qFXi;t ¡ ¹qi;t)2
i
¡
h
(nFLi;t ¡ ¹ni)2 + ¾(qFLi;t ¡ ¹qi;t)2
io
¸ ci
(16)
The above expressions completely characterize the optimal policy.
In what follows, we will show that there is a simple yet insightful way to
re-parametrize the optimal switching between the two regimes. De…ne the
shadow devaluation rate (henceforth the SDR) as the di¤erence between the
(optimally chosen) value of the exchange rate if the peg were abandoned and
the target exchange rate. The SDR will be denoted ¢~si;t. By de…nition, the
prevailing exchange rate conditional on the abandonment of the peg will be
sFLi;t = ¹si;t +¢~si;t: It is straightforward to show that the shadow devaluation
rate is increasing in the predetermined nominal wage, in both the employment
and the price targets, as well as in the country-speci…c shock. It is obviously
decreasing in the exchange rate parity that is currently defended.18
Note that rearranging the semi-reduced forms (1) and (2), the SDR can
also be written as follows
¢~si;t = ®2
³
nFLi;t ¡ nFXi;t
´
=
®2
®0
³
qFLi;t ¡ qFXi;t
´
(17)
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The interpretation of these relationships brings additional insights on the
meaning of ¢~si;t: The shadow devaluation rate is proportional to the ‘em-
ployment gap’ (nFLi;t ¡nFXi;t ), that is, the loss of employment due to defending
the existing parity. It is also proportional to the ‘price level gap’, that is, the
in‡ation bene…t from defending the peg. In either cases, the SDR provides
a measure of the welfare opportunity cost of maintaining the exchange rate
…xed.
Now, by using (17), we can rewrite the condition for an optimal choice
of exchange rate regime (16) exclusively in terms of the shadow depreciation
rate:
si;t = ¹si;t if j¢~si;tj < eci
si;t = ¹si;t + ¢~si;t if j¢~si;tj ¸ eci (18)
where ~ci is a constant.19 In other words, there exists a threshold value of the
shadow devaluation rate that triggers an optimal realignment. The threshold
value ~ci translates the welfare cost of abandoning the peg into the metric of
the SDR.
Expressions (18) draw a simple picture that captures the key features of
our model. Consider Figure 2. In this Figure, and throughout this paper, we
restrict the support of the shock so as to rule out the possibility of optimal
revaluations.20 On the x-axis we put the support of the shock. On the y-
axis we have the shadow and the actual devaluation rates (both conditional
on private agents’ expectations), as well as the “adjusted” welfare cost of a
devaluation eci. The zero on the y-axis corresponds to the existing parity.
The level of the shock¹Ài;t, at which the shadow depreciation rate crosses
the cost line, divides the support of the shock in two regions. The policy
maker will …nd it optimal to defend the exchange rate if the shock falls in
the region to the left. She will optimally abandon the peg in the region to
the right. By construction, the optimal devaluation rate conditional on aban-
doning the peg coincides with the shadow one. Thus, the actual devaluation
rate will be zero in the region to the left of the threshold, equal to the SDR
in the region to the right.
Insert Figure 2 here
Analytically and conceptually, the SDR provides a unifying framework for
di¤erent classes of currency crisis models. In the context of speculative attack
models with an exogenously speci…ed monetary rule, Flood and Garber [1984]
showed that the private sector will launch a speculative attack, depleting
reserves and forcing an abandonment of the …xed parity, as soon as the path
of the shadow ‡oating exchange rate crosses the …xed parity from below.
19
In our setup, the government will choose to abandon the …xed parity, as
soon as the shadow ‡oating exchange rate exceeds the …xed rate by a margin
su¢cient to cover the sunk devaluation cost.21
4.2 Market expectations and wage setting
The second stage of the analysis is devoted to closing the model by consider-
ing the determination of nominal wages based on rational expectations of fu-
ture domestic monetary policies. In the model under consideration, optimiz-
ing wage setters will form set their wages according to eqn.(3) above. Since
policy makers do not “tie their own hands” and do not commit themselves
to the defense of the exchange rate target under all possible contingencies,
market participants will forecast the future monetary policy by combining
two scenarios, the …rst one assuming a defense of the …xed exchange rate, the
second one assuming that the peg is abandoned and that the optimal rate of
devaluation is chosen.
We have observed before that the SDR is a linear, increasing function of
the demand shock Ài;t. Therefore, for any given probability distribution for
Ài;t (assumed to be common knowledge) there exists a devaluation threshold
¹Ài;t, de…ned as the level of the shock such that a devaluation will occur for
Ài;t ¸ ¹Ài;t. As Figure 2 illustrates, by de…nition Ài;t ¸ ¹Ài;t if and only if
¢~s ¸ ~ci.
De…ne now the probability of a realignment as
¼i;t ´ Prf¢~si;t ¸ ~cig ´ Pr fÀi;t ¸¹Ài;tg : (19)
Wage setters’ forecasts will be obtained by taking the expectations of mFXi;t
and mFLi;t conditional on, respectively, the defense of the peg (FX according
to the notation of Section 3) and a devaluation (FL), and combining them
according to their respective probabilities:
wi;t = Et¡1mi;t = (1 ¡ ¼i;t)
h
Et¡1mFXi;t jFX
i
+ ¼i;t
h
Et¡1mFLi;t jFL
i
(20)
It bears emphasizing that the wage rate obtained according to the previous
expression will be a decreasing function of the devaluation threshold¹Ài;t, so
far taken as an exogenous parameter.
To determine endogenously the devaluation threshold under rational ex-
pectations, we substitute eqn.(20) into the expression for the SDR. Then, we
evaluate the SDR at Ài;t =¹Ài;t, we equate the SDR to ~ci, and solve for¹Ài;t:
Algebraic details of the solution are presented in Appendix E.
Without speci…c assumptions on the distribution of the shock to funda-
mentals Ài;t, very little can be said about the properties of the devaluation
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threshold ¹Ài;t. An important point is that, in general, the expression for the
SDR evaluated at the devaluation threshold will be non-linear, so that its
roots will not be unique. This feature is what raises the possibility of multi-
ple instantaneous equilibria, as we discuss below. We choose to illustrate this
point by means of a parametric example, assuming a uniform distribution of
the shock.22
Insert Figure 3 here
Consider Figure 3, where Nmin and Nmax represent the lower and upper
boundaries for the country-speci…c shock Ài;t. In the top graph, we plot both
the (modi…ed) welfare cost of a devaluation ~ci and the SDR evaluated at
Ài;t =¹Ài;t against all potential values of¹Ài;t, that is, the support of the shock.
There are two crossing points, identifying two possible equilibrium levels for
the devaluation threshold. Depending on which instantaneous equilibrium
market participants coordinate their expectations on, we have two possible
levels of wages and therefore two possible levels of the shadow devaluation
rate. This is shown in the graph at the bottom of the Figure, where we
include two SDR lines. In each period, once the wage contracts are signed,
there can only be one shadow devaluation locus. Before the contracts are
signed, however, there could be more than one SDR locus that is a rational
expectations equilibrium.
5 Current explanations of the ERM crisis: an
analytical review
Most contributions on the ERM crisis are cast in terms of “unilateral peg
models” that, as our analysis makes clear, can only characterize partial equi-
libria of the broader international monetary game. Even granted the partial
equilibrium nature of these models, however, it is our view that, in several
cases, the models in the literature are developed under unduly restrictive
assumptions — especially in the de…nition and interpretation of the shock
to fundamentals. It is therefore instructive to re-interpret the most popular
explanations of the ERM crisis within our own framework.
The interpretations of the crisis reviewed in this section emphasize the
role of domestic credibility, regardless of whether the shock determining the
currency crisis originates at home or abroad. Abandoning the peg is ulti-
mately a policy decision, based on a rational assessment of costs and bene…ts
of a regime switch. The contingent nature of such a decision underlies the
expectation game between the private and the public sector. This game
can have multiple instantaneous equilibria, o¤ering the theoretical founda-
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tions for the theory that the ERM has succumbed because of destabilizing
self-ful…lling prophecies of a crisis. For a given regime of expectations, the
stability of the exchange rate depends on the perceived distribution of the
shocks as well as on the perceived opportunity costs of a regime switch.
5.1 Shifts in expectations and self-ful…lling equilibria
Consider Figure 3 once again. Suppose that the economy somehow coor-
dinates on a high threshold, low in‡ation, equilibrium (on the right). If a
devaluation is perceived as a low probability event, workers settle for a low
nominal wage, and employment is, ceteris paribus, high. Only a very ad-
verse realization of the shock (a large value of Ài;t) will force the monetary
authorities to abandon the defense of the exchange rate target in order to
maintain the level of employment. Nonetheless, the fact that the system will
indeed be safe against devaluation except in the case of very high values of
Ài;t validates, ex-post , the wage setters’ initial conjecture.
Suppose instead that market participants coordinate on the bad, high
in‡ation (low ¹Ài;t) equilibrium, so that unions perceive a high probability of
a devaluation. As the nominal wage rate is now relatively high (re‡ecting
the higher probability of future depreciation and in‡ation), the monetary
authorities will be forced to use a devaluation to restore competitiveness
in the international markets in response to even mild shocks. Only if the
external conditions turn out to be very favorable, will policy makers prefer
to keep the exchange rate …xed.
It is worth emphasizing the self-ful…lling nature of expectations in both
equilibria. If nominal wages are set at a high level, the optimal response to
external shocks is likely to be a devaluation. At the same time, the monetary
expansion associated with a devaluation validates ex-post the in‡ationary
expectations of market participants that generated the original high wage.
By the same token, if nominal wages happen to be set at a low level, the
monetary authorities will be helped by these favorable internal conditions in
their commitment to defend the parity. Exchange rate stability (as well as the
associated restrictive monetary policy) will con…rm, ex-post, the correctness
of wage setters’ expectations.
In the post-mortem interpretations of the ERM crisis, unilateral peg mod-
els with multiple instantaneous equilibria have provided a popular theoretical
foundation for the analysis of self-ful…lling speculative attacks in the foreign
exchange markets.23 According to this approach, an exchange rate crisis due
to self-ful…lling speculative behavior consists of a sudden, and completely
unanticipated, shift from the good equilibrium to the right of Figure 3 to the
bad equilibrium to the left of the same …gure, for unchanged fundamentals.
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If a crisis is triggered by such a shift in expectations, the familiar macro-
economic indicators would not give any early indication that a period of
exchange rate instability is approaching: up to the dawn of a crisis, forward-
looking asset prices in the …nancial markets would re‡ect expectations of a
persistence of the good equilibrium.
Indeed, it is apparent that …nancial markets did not anticipate the mag-
nitude of the crisis. The interest di¤erentials between ERM countries and
Germany fell on average in 1992; in the summer, there was some worsening
of credibility, but only to a very limited extent (Rose and Svensson [1994]).
Other indicators of credibility, based on option prices or survey data on ex-
change rate forecasts, con…rm these results.24 The popularity of the idea of
self-ful…lling speculative attacks is largely due to its ability to explain these
large forecast errors without postulating irrationality or …nancial market in-
e¢ciencies.
A problem with the logical foundations of this view of the crisis is that,
while demonstrating the possibility of multiple instantaneous equilibria, the
theory is silent on the mechanisms underlying the (sudden shift in the) pri-
vate sector’s coordination on a particular expectation regime. The analysis
of a speculative attack as a self-ful…lling prophecy requires a leap from the
theoretical identi…cation of the existence of multiple equilibria to the char-
acterization of an economic process (in “real time”) that the model per se
has nothing to say about: modelling expectations coordinating mechanisms
requires further theoretical structures and/or ad-hoc assumptions.
In the literature, expectations coordination mechanisms are commonly
modelled in terms of exogenous uncertainty: a random variable is assigned
an arbitrary distribution de…ned over possible equilibrium outcomes. The
models considered have the property that, provided fundamentals are weak
enough, there is, in each period, a positive probability that a “self-ful…lling”
speculative attack will occur. Such a black-box approach may be useful in
rationalizing the timing of the crisis in a country with a credibility problem
(Obstfeld [1994] and Obstfeld and Rogo¤ [1995]): what appears, prima fa-
cie, as an arbitrary and irrational switch in currency traders’ beliefs, can be
interpreted as the shift from one rational expectation equilibrium to another.
Nonetheless, if taken too literally — i.e. self-ful…lling prophecies were the
cause of the crisis — it can only o¤er a super…cial phenomenological expla-
nation of the 1992/93 currency crisis and of the persistent …nancial instability
that followed.
Despite the inherent weakness of this explanation of the crisis, it has
been argued that one is virtually bound to conclude that the crisis was in-
deed triggered by such self-ful…lling speculative attacks, because alternative
explanations based on the analysis of fundamentals tend not to perform very
23
well empirically.25 Tests have been carried out with reference to standard
two-country (or small open economy) unilateral peg models of currency cri-
sis; fundamentals include various measures of employment, activity, relative
prices and …scal de…cits. The results show that there is no clear evidence
of a deterioration of current macroeconomic indicators preceding the crisis.
Also, fundamentals do not seem to di¤er before and after the crisis.26
On empirical ground, however, the issue is not at all straightforward,
since expectations shifts triggered by self-ful…lling prophecies and expecta-
tions shifts re‡ecting fundamental shocks are, to a very large extent, obser-
vationally equivalent. In our opinion, a balanced view of the role played by
fundamental imbalances in the crisis requires …rst and foremost an appropri-
ate theoretical and analytical framework: the next sections are devoted to a
brief discussion of these points.
5.2 Three interpretations of the crisis based on funda-
mentals
The literature has provided at least three interpretations of the ERM crisis
based on economic and political fundamentals. The …rst one stresses the role
of the German reuni…cation shock, and of the German …scal-monetary policy
mix that accompanied it. The second is focused on the perceived weakening
of the political consensus in favor of the European monetary project after the
…rst Danish referendum. The third one stresses the role of competitiveness
losses implied by a disin‡ation strategy based on a …xed exchange rate.
5.2.1 German uni…cation shock: the role of learning and expec-
tations updating
The basic elements of the …rst story are well-known.27 The German domes-
tic demand boom, partly fueled by the sustained and largely de…cit-…nanced
…scal transfers from the West to the Eastern regions of the country, partly
fueled by the conversion of GDR-Marks into D-Marks at the overvalued av-
erage rate of 1:8 to 1, put upward pressures on the German real exchange
rate. Given the Bundesbank’s commitment to contain in‡ationary pressures,
a D-Mark real appreciation would require either a nominal devaluation or a
de‡ation in the rest of the ERM. The employment and …scal costs of such a
de‡ation undermine the stability of the exchange rate.
One of the most common objections to explanations of the crisis based
on the German reuni…cation shock concerns timing. Why does the 1990
German reuni…cation shock bring about a crisis in 1992? If such a shock was
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so important, shouldn’t forward-looking …nancial markets have anticipated
the crisis well before 1992?
In the light of our model, this objection has little ground. Once the
model is speci…ed appropriately, the role of current aggregate demand shocks
in generating a currency crisis is greatly reduced. Disregard for the time
being the international spillovers and the policy game, and focus on the
nature of the Center demand shock. The relevant shock to fundamentals
²t is the innovation to the present discounted value of current and future
IS disturbances (broadly interpreted to include the German monetary-…scal
policy mix following uni…cation), ¸¤t in Appendix A. This feature of the
model means that considerations about the stability of the distribution of
the shocks, their persistence over time, as well as the learning process should
be given appropriate weight in the analysis of the crisis. In terms of our
reconstruction, two speci…c points can be made about the behavior of the
fundamentals.
First, private agents may have been unable to disentangle the permanent
and transitory components of the shock. In this case, it is well known that
rational forecasts will be characterized by a typical adaptive pattern and
“learning” behavior. As the magnitude and duration of the West-to-East …s-
cal transfers associated with German uni…cation was only revealed gradually,
the full implications of the shock for the stability of the exchange rate could
only emerge over time.
Second, German reuni…cation, and the German macroeconomic policy
response to it, was an unprecedented economic and political event. To the
extent that the nature of the shock made it di¢cult to evaluate the parame-
ters of the structural form, estimates of its magnitude and persistence were
likely to be subject to drastic revisions over time.
To clarify this point, assume that the relative demand disturbance is
generated by a simple …rst-order autoregressive process
¸¤t ¡ ¸ = ½
³
¸¤t¡1 ¡ ¸
´
+ ´t; 0 < ½ < 1 (21)
where the innovation ´t is i.i.d. with zero mean. The higher the coe¢cient
of serial correlation (½), the more persistent the relative IS disturbance. It
follows that the (absolute value of the) exogenous shock to fundamentals in
eqn.(6) will be increasing in ½:
²t =
°
º (1 ¡ 2¯)
¸¤t ¡ ¸
1 ¡ °½ (22)
A sudden revision of the parameter ½ implies a jump in the shock to fun-
damentals ²t for any given realization of ¸¤t . This process of revision occurs
over time and is not necessarily smooth.
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The uncompromising attitude of the Bundesbank — insofar as interest
rate policy was concerned —was fully revealed only at the dawn of the crisis.
It is worth recalling that even at the Bath meeting on September 5-6 1992,
the possibility of an interest rate cut was considered a feasible policy option
by ERM policy-makers, including the British Chancellor of the Exchequer.28
The perceived intransigence of the German authorities might have translated
into a reassessment of the persistence of the high interest rate regime, indexed
by an upward jump in ½ in our setup. As a consequence, in the framework
of Figure 2, ²t and the entire structure of country-speci…c shocks Ài;t could
have suddenly jumped from the left to the right of the devaluation threshold
¹Ài;t, triggering a currency crisis.
While we believe that the international policy game has played a far
more important role in the crisis than learning and revision of expectations,
(leading us to add the rules of the international policy game to the list of
fundamentals in Section 6 below), one cannot dismiss the importance of these
other considerations. Our analysis suggests caution in relying too much on
empirical evidence on “contemporaneous shocks” to fundamentals, those re-
lated to the German uni…cation shock as well as others. The absence of any
obvious contemporaneous change in observable macroeconomic variables may
not carry much weight in one’s interpretation of the crisis, once the intertem-
poral nature of shocks to fundamentals is taken into account appropriately.
5.2.2 The perceived change in policy-makers’ commitment to ex-
change rate stability
The focus of the second interpretation of the crisis as the result of develop-
ments in fundamentals, is on the policy makers’ commitment to exchange
rate stability. At the beginning of the 1990’s, the perceived political bene…ts
from participating in the ERM were high. Price stability being a national
priority, governments tended to base the credibility of their anti-in‡ationary
policies on their ability to maintain a stable exchange rate vis-à-vis the D-
mark. The …rst Danish referendum, and later public opinion polls in France,
revealed that the popular consensus over Maastricht was much weaker than
previously believed. The social costs of de‡ationary policies, exacerbated by
the regime of high interest rates following German reuni…cation, suddenly be-
came less bearable. The temptation to correct domestic imbalances through
a devaluation grew stronger. An interpretation of the crisis in terms of a po-
litical shock helps explain its timing and persistence, insofar as the weakening
of popular support for Maastricht spreads to the entire EMS.
In our theoretical framework, the e¤ect of a downward revision in the
perceived political cost of a devaluation can be modeled as a decrease in the
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welfare cost ci (and ~ci). Focusing on a good, low in‡ation, rational expectation
equilibrium, such as the one to the right of Figure 4, it is apparent that
a downward shift in ~ci increases the probability of a crisis, lowering the
threshold ¹Ài;t and increasing the equilibrium nominal wages. For the new
level of nominal wages, the SDR line in the graph shifts to the left.
Insert Figure 4 here
In principle, more could be said in this respect within a theoretical frame-
work where political costs are made explicit in terms of acceptable primitives.
The literature provides a few examples of such theoretical exercises. Froot
and Rogo¤ [1991] point out the destabilizing end-game e¤ects of the Maas-
tricht time-table for EMU, insofar as deadlines raise the temptation to resort
to a …nal realignment before locking in the exchange rate irrevocably at a
…xed Euro conversion rate. Currie [1992], among others, carries out welfare
analysis based on the social loss function (8), comparing EMU to alternative
exchange rate arrangements. As the sign of the net gains from EMU com-
pared to an adjustable peg is qualitatively ambiguous, quantitative welfare
analysis is required to shed light on the reasons for the expressions of politi-
cal disagreement on the Maastricht project. However, any interpretation of
the ERM events within this framework is contingent on (arbitrary) assump-
tions concerning the expected monetary stance of the European central bank
following EMU. As shown in Alesina and Grilli [1993], the results of such a
quantitative welfare analysis depend crucially on whether or not, or to what
extent, national policy preferences will be re‡ected in the behavior of the
European Central Bank.
5.2.3 Inherent weakness of disin‡ation policies based on an exter-
nal nominal anchor
The third “fundamental” explanation points to an inherent weakness of any
price stabilization policy based on pegging the exchange rate. If either in‡a-
tion has inertia or the new exchange rate regime is not perfectly credible, the
policy initially results in an appreciation of the real exchange rate. Worsen-
ing competitiveness a¤ects the trade balance, production and employment.
A successful implementation of the policy thus requires a country to push its
domestic rate of in‡ation below that of the Center country in order to o¤set
the initial real appreciation. Since the costs of the required de‡ation are
generally high, the commitment to maintain the exchange rate parity may
not be credible.
Such a scheme applies reasonably well to the Italian and the English
cases. It does not explain, however, why speculative attacks hit the cur-
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rency of countries, such as France, where there are no unambiguous signs
of a deteriorating external competitiveness (conventionally measured by real
exchange rates based on CPI or unit labor costs).29
A model with one-period wage contracts can only o¤er a stylized account
of these e¤ects based on the consequences of imperfect credibility on the
output and competitiveness of a country. Without an in‡ationary bias in
the Periphery, the equilibrium real exchange rate in our would not change
in response to the Center shock. As long as the commitment to the …xed
parity is not perfectly credible, a disin‡ation policy based on an external
nominal anchor causes the competitiveness of the Periphery countries vis-
a-vis the Center to deteriorate. This in‡ationary bias and the associated
real exchange rate overvaluation persists as long as the imperfect credibility
persists.
It is also possible to generalize the theoretical framework, by including
multi-period wage contracts – a rather demanding approach on technical
grounds – or by making the costs of disin‡ation policies lasting for more
than one period. Drazen and Masson [1994], for instance, adopt a theoreti-
cal framework that incorporates hysteresis in unemployment. As a result, a
tough stance in defense of the exchange rate parity increases the “natural”
rate of unemployment over time. Obstfeld [1994] discusses a model where
the domestic policy game is not de…ned in terms of the trade-o¤ between
in‡ation and unemployment, but in terms of the trade-o¤ between the dis-
tortions of in‡ation and the distortions due to a high level of non-lump sum
taxation, faced by a government with a high public debt. In both examples,
the presence of a state variable – the ‘memory’ of past unemployment rates
in one case and the level of public debt in the other case – captures the
cumulative cost of defending the peg. In both cases, a currency crisis can
occur despite stable or even improving current fundamentals: it is in fact the
cumulative e¤ect of the fundamental ‘stock’, not the marginal e¤ect of its
‘‡ow’, that matters in determining the timing of a devaluation.
6 Non-cooperative equilibrium: the systemic
dimension
6.1 The missing element: modelling the international
policy game
While private-public sectors interactions at the domestic level are certainly
an important part of the process that brought down the ERM, explanations
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of the 92-93 crisis that focus exclusively on the national dimension are bound
to miss a key element. As we have seen, the domestic shadow devaluation rate
completely characterizes the monetary policy of a country. Nonetheless, for
any given structure of spillovers, it is not possible to determine an individual
country’s SDR without knowing the policy stance of the other countries in
the system. To this issue we turn next.
Our approach stresses an explanation of the crisis in terms of funda-
mentals, but augments the traditional list of fundamentals with the rules
of the international monetary policy game, that is the cooperative or non-
cooperative design of monetary and exchange rate policy in the Periphery.
While our approach does not rule out the possibility of multiple instanta-
neous equilibria for given fundamentals, it goes through even if the domestic
equilibrium is unique.
In our discussion, we will assume that the private sectors of each and
every country coordinate on the same equilibrium. Throughout the analysis,
we will make the simplifying assumptions that all policy makers in the Pe-
riphery have the same employment target and face the same welfare cost of
a devaluation:
¹ni = ¹n and ci = c for all countries i: (23)
We also assume that the private sectors coordinate their expectations on the
same (multi-country) equilibrium, that is
wi;t ¡ ¹si = wj;t ¡ ¹sj for all countries i; j: (24)
E¤ectively, therefore, all countries in the Periphery are ex-ante identical.
To avoid misleading interpretations, it is worth emphasizing that the as-
sumptions of symmetry (23) and (24) are only made in order to highlight
the speci…c role of international policy coordination in the logic of an ex-
change rate regime crisis, while abstracting from cross-country di¤erences in
economic structure, inherited economic conditions, domestic credibility and
subjective expectations. Asymmetries between European countries in the
early 1990s were by no means negligible, and there is no doubt that such
di¤erences should be taken into account in a complete assessment of the
ERM crisis. Nevertheless, the twelve months spanned by September 92 and
August 93 witnessed a wave of crises within the ERM which appear to be un-
related to visible divergences in macroeconomic policy stance and economic
performance among European economies.
To the extent that the 92-93 events in Europe represent the breakdown
of a system, rather than the crisis of the unilateral exchange rate policies
undertaken by a collection of isolated countries, intra-Periphery asymmetries
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do not help understand the nature of the ERM puzzle. Thus, the (admittedly
unrealistic) assumption of symmetry in our exercise allows us to focus on the
crucial issues at stake, while de-emphasizing other factors contributing to the
crisis.
As wages are taken as given parameters, and the determination of market
expectations is left backstage in what follows, there is no need to emphasize
further the time dimension of our model. Therefore, for notational conve-
nience we will drop time subscripts throughout the rest of the paper.
6.2 Monetary strategies in the Center and the Periph-
ery
In the absence of coordination, each country takes monetary ‘actions’ in other
countries as given, and determines its optimal ‘reaction’. Consider the Center
…rst. As the Center optimally pursues a Friedman-style monetary rule, its
policy strategy completely insulates employment from domestic and external
disturbances. The Center “reaction function” is therefore
n¤ = 0 (25)
In the Periphery, each country determines its optimal monetary strategy
according to the analysis of Section 4.1. Due to the presence of lump-sum re-
alignment costs, the reaction function for the representative Periphery coun-
try i is discontinuous: by using (14), (15) and the de…nition of the shock Ài,
we can in fact characterize the Periphery reaction function as follows:
ni =
1
®2
(¹si + ¢si ¡ wi ¡ ²) + ®1®2
X
j 6=i
nj
¢si =
(
0 if ¢~si < ~c
¢~si if ¢~si ¸ ~c (26)
This expression makes it clear that the sign and the magnitude of the spillover
e¤ects (the parameter ®1) are central to our interpretation of the Periphery
reaction functions and the Nash equilibrium they support. The reaction
function (26) shows that, if ®1 is positive, the money stocks of any pair
of countries, j and i, are strategic complements:30 for a positive ®1; the
best response to country j’s monetary expansion is a monetary expansion in
country i as well.
An important implication of a dominant expenditure-changing e¤ect (®1 >
0) is that a monetary expansion in one country tends to enhance the stability
of the peg in all other Periphery countries, because it lowers their shadow
devaluation rate (and the welfare gain from a devaluation) for any level of
the exogenous shock.31
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6.3 The optimal number and size of exchange rate re-
alignments
Once monetary policies are determined on the basis of the reaction func-
tions (26), it is possible to characterize the international dimension of the
non-cooperative (Nash) equilibrium as follows. The support of the shock
² is split into three segments, de…ned in terms of two thresholds: a lower
threshold denoted by ²d and an upper threshold denoted by¹²d. In equilib-
rium, all Periphery countries defend the peg when the shock ² is below the
lower threshold ²d; all Periphery countries jointly devalue their currencies by
the same percentage when the shock is larger than the upper threshold¹²d;
some Periphery countries (NFL of them) devalue their currencies while some
(N ¡NFL) maintain the peg when the shock falls between the two thresh-
olds (²dand¹²d). In this equilibrium, no Periphery country …nds it optimal
to devalue against the Center when some other Periphery country revalues
instead.
While leaving the analytical derivation of these results to Appendix F,
we summarize and visualize the properties of the Nash equilibrium in Figure
5. The graph at the top plots the fraction of countries abandoning the peg
(NFL=N) against the support of the shock ². The second graph plots the
shadow devaluation rate – which, for each country that abandons the peg,
is also that country’s actual depreciation rate – against the support of the
shock ². The graph at the bottom presents the information contained in the
…rst two graphs in a di¤erent way, by plotting the average depreciation rate
of the Periphery as a whole vis-à-vis the Center.
Insert Figure 5 here
To understand the economic intuition underlying these graphs, compare
Figure 5 with Figure 2, where the shadow devaluation rate is plotted against
the country-speci…c shock Ài. In Figure 2, the higher the country-speci…c
shock, the higher the devaluation rate if the Periphery country …nds it op-
timal to abandon the peg. At the point Ài = ¹Ài the country is indi¤erent
between devaluing and not devaluing by the percentage ¢esi: in other words,
at the threshold¹Ài, the welfare bene…ts of a devaluation in terms of higher
employment are exactly o¤set by the political loss of anti-in‡ationary repu-
tation.
Now, recall that the country-speci…c shock is a combination of the global
shock ² and the monetary stance in the rest of the system. Thus, Ài can
be equal to ¹À i when the global shock is relatively low and no Periphery
country expands its money supply. Equally, Ài can be equal to ¹Ài when
the global shock is su¢ciently large and many Periphery countries follow
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expansionary policies and devalue. We conclude that there is a continuum of
combinations of ², the fundamental shock, and NFL, the number of countries
that choose to devalue, for which a Periphery country remains indi¤erent
between maintaining the peg and devaluing at the the constant rate ¢esi = ~c.
Thus, when we plot the shadow devaluation rate ¢esi against the support of
the shock ², as in Figure 5, the point corresponding to the value of Ài = ¹Ài
in Figure 2 stretches over some range of ²; the edges of this range in Figure
5 are ²d and ¹²d.
6.4 Asymmetric exchange rate policies, symmetric wel-
fare levels
Each country, taking as given the behavior of all other countries, will inde-
pendently determine whether it is preferable to peg or ‡oat according to the
rule given in eqn. (18), that is, by comparing the country-speci…c shadow
devaluation rate with the devaluation threshold. The model determines the
number of countries that will devalue in equilibrium. Which countries will
actually abandon the peg is not determined. Only when the shock ² is either
extremely high or extremely low, will the exchange rate behavior be identical
across ex-ante symmetric countries (either they will all peg, or they will all
devalue by the same amount). It is important to stress that, in the Nash
equilibrium we have constructed, Periphery countries that start o¤ identical
also share the same level of welfare ex post for any realization of the shock,
even when their exchange rate policies di¤er.
This latter point deserves special attention. In order to stress the role
of the international factors in in‡uencing the behavior of the national policy
authorities, we have abstracted from structural di¤erences at the national
level by assuming perfectly symmetrical countries. Yet, as stated before, for
some intermediate range of the shock, there will be a number of Periphery
countries which …nd it optimal to abandon the peg while the other countries
optimally maintain the defense of their exchange rate parities. In other
words, Periphery countries facing the same global shock will act in a highly
asymmetric way.
Ex-ante, the policy-makers in the Periphery countries are all equally cred-
ible in their commitment to keep the exchange rate …xed; the fundamentals
of each economy are exactly the same, except for di¤erences induced by the
behavior of other countries. However, because of the international spillovers
from domestic policy making, the macroeconomic outlook of ex-ante identical
countries may vary considerably ex-post. Some economies will have higher
in‡ation, lower unemployment and a depreciated currency, while some other
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economies will keep in‡ation down at the cost of relative higher unemploy-
ment without devaluing their currencies.
The sustainability of the exchange rate regime in the second group is
helped by the behavior of the …rst group. This is because, under reason-
able assumptions on the sign of international policy spillovers, the monetary
expansion induced by a devaluation in country j (say, UK) lowers the real
interest rate in the Center country and everywhere in the system, reduc-
ing …nancial tensions in country i (say, France) that does not devalue. At
the same time, the devaluation of the …rst group of countries reduces CPI
in‡ation in the second group.
The presence of intra-Periphery spillovers creates strategic interactions
among policy makers: heuristically, the devaluation of country j’s currency
will a¤ect the decision of country i through a shift to the right of this coun-
try’s SDR for any level of the shock to fundamentals ². Should the Periphery
countries try to internalize these e¤ect in their policy making? What are the
implications of policy coordination for the stability of the exchange rate sys-
tem? This question is addressed by the next section.
7 Cooperative equilibrium and national hor-
izontal equity
7.1 Welfare implications of the international monetary
spillovers
Before delving into the analysis of the cooperative equilibrium, it is important
to check whether the kind of international policy spillovers we have been fo-
cusing on are positive or negative from the point of view of welfare in the other
countries in the system. We have shown that, under the maintained assump-
tion that the expenditure-changing e¤ects of a monetary expansion prevail
over its expenditure-switching e¤ects in the rest of the Periphery (®1 > 0),
monetary instruments are strategic complements in the policy game. We can
now show that, in the presence of shocks to aggregate demand in the Center,
a monetary expansion in country j has a positive external e¤ect on welfare
of country i.
To see this, it is su¢cient to consider the case of a shock to aggregate
demand in the Center that is high enough to trigger a common devaluation
in the Periphery when all countries play Nash. Focus on country i. In this
country, holding domestic money supply (and employment) constant, higher
values of the shock ² translate, other things equal, into a higher depreciation
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rate and therefore into a higher domestic CPI level. Now, under our hypothe-
ses about the international transmission of monetary policy, a devaluation by
any other Periphery country will induce an appreciation of country i’s cur-
rency vis-à-vis the Center, partly o¤setting the in‡ationary consequences of
the shock to aggregate demand in the Center. As the international spillovers
of a monetary expansion in another Periphery country reduce country i0s
CPI toward its current target value, its optimal monetary policy (conditional
on abandoning the peg) becomes more expansionary, bringing employment
closer to its target level and increasing domestic welfare.32
We may expect that, in the presence of welfare incentives to coordinate
national monetary policies and internalize reciprocal spillovers, a system of
exchange rates based on an international agreement like the ERM could pro-
vide the appropriate institutional framework to do so. Coordination, how-
ever, may not be a feasible option: not only because the cooperative equi-
librium requires an e¤ective enforcement mechanism (to prevent individually
rational unilateral deviations from the agreement) that may not be available
to the countries in the system in all circumstances, but also because there
may be lack of consensus and agreement on how the costs and bene…ts from
coordinated policies should be distributed among the individual countries.
7.2 Politically feasible cooperation
What determines the feasibility of international monetary cooperation? We
build a scenario making three descriptively realistic (in the context of the
ERM) assumptions about the nature of the game played by the Periphery
countries and the Center. First, the Center never coordinates its monetary
policy with the Periphery, while the Periphery countries can cooperate among
themselves. Second, intra-Periphery cooperation is subject to a national hor-
izontal equity constraint. This constraint requires all cooperating countries
(which are identical ex-ante) to be equally well o¤ ex-post. Third, we rule
out side-payments among the Periphery countries. In this section we brie‡y
discuss the rationale underlying these three assumptions.
First, in making the Center’s monetary policy always independent of poli-
cies in the Periphery, regardless of whether these are coordinated or not, we
abstract from issues regarding cooperation between the Center and the Pe-
riphery. Our maintained hypothesis is that cooperation is perceived in the
Center as an unacceptable compromise on internal objectives. Some authors
have even pointed out that a Center-Periphery coordination may not be in
the interest of the Periphery either, to the extent that international compro-
mises undermines the anti-in‡ationary credibility of the conservative central
bank in the Center country (Alesina and Grilli [1993]).
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Second, the case we focus on has all Periphery countries cooperating to
minimize the sum of the individual loss functions, internalizing the monetary
externalities: Even though all Periphery countries are structurally identical,
this need not automatically imply that in a cooperative equilibrium they
would either achieve equal welfare or adopt the same policies. Obviously,
the existence of the …xed (sunk) per-country cost of abandoning the parity
implies that, for small shocks ²; it might be e¢cient — as regards the sum of
the national welfare levels— to have but a few countries devalue, even if this
would make the devaluing countries worse o¤ than the remaining countries
that stick to their …xed parities.
The question is then whether schemes of cooperation with the property
that ex-ante identical countries are not guaranteed to be equally well o¤ ex
post can be said to be characteristic of actual policy making in Europe. Al-
though technically possible and economically e¢cient, such schemes would
hardly be considered politically acceptable. First, there could be consider-
able disagreement about the nature and the magnitude of the common shock
as well as about the severity of the domestic credibility problem. Second,
because of uncertainty regarding the shock and di¢culty in monitoring in-
dividual policy makers’ behavior, complex cooperation schemes may create
incentives to misbehave that substantially reduce the gains from cooperation.
For these reasons, we impose in what follows as a “primitive” a national
horizontal equity constraint in the joint maximization problem de…ning the
cooperative agreement.33 This constraint states that, if the Periphery coun-
tries are symmetric before the shock is observed, no Periphery nation would
agree on implementing a cooperative action that would, ex-post, make it
worse o¤ than any other Periphery nation.34 In other words, no discrepancy
in welfare levels among symmetric Periphery countries is permitted under
any circumstances.35
Third, a restriction of identical ex-post utility levels need not translate
into a restriction of symmetric use of the policy instruments. In principle, a
system of redistributive international transfers could remove asymmetries in
welfare levels generated, on impact, by nationally di¤erentiated policy mea-
sures within a cooperative framework.36 Contingent transfers could therefore
be used to compensate the declining competitiveness of the countries that
do not devalue. It is worth stressing that such a view neglects the costs
associated with the loss of reputation and anti-in‡ationary credibility ac-
companying a realignment. It may well be that, under a national horizontal
equity constraint, transfers would paradoxically run in the opposite direc-
tion, from countries that keep the exchange rate …xed (thus gaining “more”
in terms of disin‡ation) to those that give up the exchange rate parity.
We believe that ruling out these kinds of transfers or side-payments as a
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maintained hypothesis captures a realistic feature of the actual working of
the ERM. Of course there are many intra-EU transfers, with a wide variety
of motivations and goals, many of which are designed to meet speci…c dis-
tributional or re-structuring objectives. However, to our knowledge, there is
no transfer ‡ow contingent on the implementation of coordinated exchange
rate policy, or of any other aspect of macroeconomic policy.37
In our symmetric context, when all intra-Periphery externalities are taken
into account and side-payments are ruled out, the behavior of each single
Periphery country must be equal to the average behavior of the Periphery as a
whole: if a realignment occurs, all Periphery countries realign simultaneously
and by the same amount. We provide an admittedly extreme but instructive
scenario in which distributional con‡icts in designing joint exchange rate
policies may actually inhibit desirable policy initiatives.
Insofar as the realism of our framework is concerned, it is worth recalling
that generalized devaluations represented an institutional reality in the his-
tory of the ERM since its very early stages. Six out of eleven realignments
between 1979 and 1987 involved all ERM currencies (excluding the Dutch
guilder, which was realigned only in two cases). The other realignments,
which involved only one or two currencies, were typically triggered by spe-
ci…c national contingencies rather than representing the collective response
to global shocks, such as a sharp fall of the US dollar.38
Summarizing, we restrict cooperative behavior in the Periphery to be
symmetric. In our framework, countries can only agree on symmetric de-
valuation, that is, devaluation at a common rate, or no devaluation. As we
will show, under some circumstances — that is, when the national horizon-
tal equity becomes a binding constraint — it may be collectively rational to
give up cooperation. If there is no feasible way to solve the distributional
con‡icts involved in coordination, then uncoordinated Nash behavior may be
welfare-improving for both individual countries and the ERM as a whole, as
long as it leads to a higher overall degree of monetary expansion in response
to the Center shock.
7.3 Optimal policies and equilibrium under symmetric
cooperation
If all Periphery countries coordinate and act symmetrically, they e¤ectively
behave as if they where a single currency area vis-à-vis the Center, by in-
ternalizing all the cross-country e¤ects on employment and in‡ation of their
national monetary policies. Consider …rst the optimal monetary policy con-
ditional on a coordinated symmetric abandonment of the peg. Given that
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the common objective function is the equally weighted sum of domestic ob-
jective functions, the optimal money supply in the representative Periphery
country i satis…es
nCSi ¡ ¹n+ ¾ (®+ ¯Á) (qCSi ¡ ¹qi) = 0 (27)
where the superscript CS refers to coordinated symmetric behavior by the
Periphery countries.
Policy makers will resort to a coordinated symmetric revaluation or de-
valuation of the domestic currencies if and only if
NX
i=1
1
2
nh
(nFXi ¡ ¹n)2 + ¾(qFXi ¡ ¹qi)2
i
¡
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(nCSi ¡ ¹n)2 + ¾(qCSi ¡ ¹qi)2
io
¸ Nc
(28)
Following our analytical scheme introduced in Section 4.1— algebraic details
are presented in Appendix G — this policy rule can be written in terms of
the SDR:
¢~sCSi ¸ ~cCS (29)
where ~cCS is a constant.39 As in the case where individual countries play
Nash, the optimal choice of exchange rate regime requires the comparison of
the SDR with the cost of abandoning the peg expressed in the appropriate
metric.
The SDR under policy-coordination is of course di¤erent from the SDR
under Nash behavior, as it corresponds to a di¤erent optimal monetary pol-
icy. Expressing the SDR as a function of the shock to fundamentals, it is
straightforward to show that there exists a threshold value of the shock¹²CS
such that the Periphery will jointly devalue for ² ¸¹²CS, and jointly maintain
the peg for ² ·¹²CS .
8 Currency crises as systemic failures
8.1 Cooperative and Nash equilibria compared
We compare the Nash and the cooperative equilibria in Figures 6a and 6b.
Each Figure includes three graphs, plotting the shadow depreciation rate,
the number of countries devaluing and the average devaluation rate for both
equilibria against the support of the shock. The two …gures are drawn for
di¤erent values of the parameters: in particular, the in‡ationary bias in the
Periphery of the system is “worse” in Figure 6a compared to 6b. In each
graph, the solid line refers to the non-cooperative equilibrium, the broken
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line to the cooperative equilibrium.
Insert Figure 6a and 6b here
There are three results worth emphasizing. First, the level of the shock
that triggers a generalized devaluation in the Periphery of the system is
smaller under cooperation than under Nash — compare the position of the
relevant threshold values¹²CS <¹²d in both Figures 6a and 6b. This result
stems from the assumption of positive external e¤ects of domestic monetary
policy. Intuitively, as Canzoneri and Henderson [1991] put it, “when policy
makers impose positive externalities on one another, cooperation calls for
doing more, rather than less”. Thus, for any distribution of the shock, a
simultaneous realignment by all countries is ‘more likely’ under symmetric
cooperative behavior than under Nash.
However, symmetric coordination need not imply more frequent realign-
ments tout-court, as, under Nash, uncoordinated devaluations by a subset of
countries are possible also for ² ·¹²d. In Figure 6b, for instance, when ² is be-
tween ²d and¹²CS; some countries will devalue in a Nash equilibrium, while all
Periphery countries will maintain the peg under a cooperative agreement.40
Our second point refers to the magnitude of realignments rather than on
their likelihood or “timing”. Provided that a coordinated realignment occurs,
the average devaluation by the Periphery countries as a group will be larger
in a coordinated equilibrium than under Nash, even when the individual
country’s optimal depreciation rate (conditional on abandoning the peg) is
higher in a Nash equilibrium.
Such a result is shown by the graphs at the bottom of Figure 6a and 6b,
where, to the right of the threshold ¹²CS, the broken line (Coordination) is
always above the solid line (Nash). The nature of the external e¤ect of a
Periphery country’s monetary policy on the other Periphery countries’ wel-
fare provides the rationale for this result. For shocks large enough to make
all countries devalue in both equilibria, the average money supply in the Pe-
riphery will be larger in a symmetric cooperative equilibrium than in a Nash
equilibrium. The (common) devaluation rate will correspondingly be higher
in the symmetric cooperative equilibrium. A fortiori, for smaller shocks (yet
large enough to make all countries devalue in a coordinated symmetric equi-
librium), a Nash equilibrium results in a suboptimally low average monetary
expansion in the Periphery, implying an average depreciation lower than in
the case of symmetric coordination.
Nevertheless, it is possible that an individual country devalues more in a
Nash equilibrium than in a coordinated symmetric equilibrium. Such a pos-
sibility is illustrated by the plots of individual devaluation rates in the middle
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of both Figures 6a and 6b. In these plots, there is a range of realizations of
the shock for which the solid line is above the broken line. In this case, the
subset of countries that devalue in a Nash equilibrium do so at an individual
rate higher than the common devaluation rate in a symmetric coordinated
equilibrium. Note that, as shown by Figure 6a, this is a possibility also when
Periphery countries resort to coordinated devaluations much “before” any
country would devalue in a Nash allocation (²d >¹²CS).
The explanation of this result has to be found in the di¤erential impact
of coordinated and non coordinated devaluations on the real interest rate in
the system as a whole. An uncoordinated devaluation by a few countries
has a limited impact on the real interest rate in the system. Thus, output
stabilization by the countries that opt for a ‡oat requires a relative large
jump in their exchange rates. A coordinated devaluation by many countries,
instead, brings down the system-wide real interest rate substantially. The
bene…t from a large individual country exchange rate depreciation for out-
put stabilization purposes is much lower, compared to its costs in terms of
in‡ation.
Our third and last point refers to an important e¤ect of the national
horizontal equity constraint. When this constraint is binding, there may ex-
ist a range of realizations of the shock for which no country devalues in a
coordinated symmetric equilibrium, while some countries devalue in a Nash
equilibrium. This is illustrated by Figure 6b, where, for values of the shock
between ²d and¹²CS, no symmetric devaluation is possible, while some Pe-
riphery countries would …nd it optimal to devalue when playing Nash. In
such a range, monetary policy in the system as a whole is less expansionary
in a symmetric coordinated equilibrium than in a Nash equilibrium.
The implications of this result deserve special attention, as they stress
the possibility that, for given wages, ex post welfare could be higher in a
Nash equilibrium than in a coordinated symmetric equilibrium. This will
be the case for values of ² that are not large enough to trigger a coordi-
nated symmetric devaluation, but large enough to induce an uncoordinated
devaluation by some countries in a Nash equilibrium. For such values of the
shock, no-cooperation dominates symmetric (constrained) cooperation, from
the point of view of the Periphery countries as a group and indeed from the
point of view of the system as a whole. This is an important result for our
interpretation of the ERM crisis. We will return on this point shortly.
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8.2 Policy tensions, market responses, and exchange
rate crises
Is there a speci…c role for policy coordination in the crisis of an exchange rate
system? An exchange rate arrangement is primarily a mechanism for policy
coordination. If the relations between Center and Periphery are assumed to
be frozen in non-cooperative behavior, the only coordination options available
are those open to the Periphery countries among themselves. To the extent
that cooperative behavior prevails in the Periphery of the system (and Pe-
riphery countries are ex-ante perceived as su¢ciently similar to each other),
the outcome can be described by using the results from our analysis.
Intuitively, in response to a demand shock in the Center, the Periphery
will tend not to implement a joint (symmetric cooperative) devaluation, un-
less the recessionary costs of defending the exchange rate are high enough
to o¤set the collective political cost of reneging on the commitment to peg.
Conditional on abandoning the peg, the common devaluation rate will be set
in a way that fully internalizes all intra-Periphery international spillovers.
As the real exchange rate of the Periphery as a whole falls markedly, there is
only a limited need to use the exchange rate for stabilization purposes: the
common devaluation rate will be small in equilibrium.
A crisis of the exchange rate system is primarily a crisis of the cooperation
agreement that de…nes and sustains it. In our theoretical framework, there
are at least two ways in which a crisis may emerge. First, to the extent that
the coordination scheme lacks an e¤ective enforcement mechanism, individ-
ual countries always have an incentive to renege on the agreement and play
according to their individual reaction functions. Although the hypothesis of
an exchange rate crisis stemming from individually deviant behavior raises
an issue of logical consistency — why did the deviant countries accept to be
part of the system in the …rst place? —, it is not unrealistic.41 Consider
a realization of the shock slightly larger than ²d in Figure 6a. While coor-
dination requires a generalized devaluation, national policy makers may be
tempted to “save” their currency. After all, as Figure 6a suggests, in a Nash
equilibrium just to the right of ²d; it may take the devaluation of just one
currency to absorb the shock and save the rest of the Periphery from the
embarrassment of reneging on the announced exchange rate targets.
If market participants’ beliefs are based on the assumption of symmetric
cooperative behavior, they will expect, for a shock in the range under con-
sideration, to observe a sizable appreciation of the Center’s real exchange
rate, to be achieved through cooperative small uniform devaluations of all
currencies in the Periphery. In such a situation, a large devaluation by one
country provides a strong signal to market participants that national policy
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makers are no longer acting cooperatively.
If the Periphery as a whole reverts to undiluted Nash, some countries will
maintain their exchange rate parity vis-à-vis the Center. For the others, the
equilibrium devaluation rate needs to be large. Since, on average, the mone-
tary stance of the system is not as expansionary as under coordination, real
interest rates do not fall as much: devaluing countries will use their exchange
rate instrument to target a sustained increase in the level of aggregate de-
mand. Ultimately, large-scale currency crises in a number of countries will
be required to modify appreciably the e¤ective terms of trade of the Center.
Note that in this …rst interpretation of a currency crisis ²d falls to the right
of ¹²CS: therefore, the national horizontal equity constraint is not binding,
nor it plays any role in the story.
In our second interpretation of the emergence of a crisis, illustrated in
Figure 6b, national horizontal equity is instead an important issue. Consider
a realization of the shock in the range (²d,¹²CS): a shock which is sizable but
not large enough to justify a collective devaluation puts the system under
considerable stress. If a cooperative defense of the peg prevails, the Periphery
countries perceive that the individual gains from a unilateral devaluation are
high.
Implementing a coordinated but selective (that is, non-universal) deval-
uation is a problem when there are no instruments to distribute its costs
and bene…ts evenly across nations. For realizations of the shock in the range
(²d,¹²CS), the loss in welfare from constrained cooperative behavior is partly
avoided in a Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium would accomplish what
symmetric coordination cannot: some subset of countries would devalue,
making the monetary stance in the system more expansionary (although not
by enough to maximize the sum of the national welfare functions).
If policy makers realize that the system is in such a state, it could be
collectively rational to revert to Nash, and thus to implement uncoordinated
large devaluations. Even if, in the eye of an observer, these devaluations
may look like a disorderly response by domestic policy makers to market
pressures, they would nonetheless be consistent with (constrained) welfare
maximization both at the level of the individual Periphery country and from
the point of view of the Periphery as a collective. Yet again, a realignment
involving only one country would signal to the private markets that the
exchange rate mechanism as a coordination device has ground to a halt.
What is the role of markets in a crisis of the exchange rate system? The
answer to this question is complex, because markets play both an active and
a passive role. As regards their active role, in our theoretical framework,
private sector expectations are re‡ected in the level of the predetermined
nominal variables. Higher nominal wages, ceteris paribus, reduce the stabil-
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ity (and viability) of a peg: all threshold values for the shock determining
both coordinated or uncoordinated optimal switches between exchange rate
regimes are functions of the predetermined nominal variables. On the other
hand, once private expectations are formed, exchange rate policies are the
outcome of rational decision making by the national authorities, who assess
the costs and bene…ts of defending the peg, given the current realization of
the shock to the fundamental. In this sense, the behavior of the …nancial
markets may be seen as a passive re‡ection of policy makers’ choices, and a
currency crisis would be nothing but the expression, in the …nancial markets,
of the tensions that lead to the breaking up of the international agreement
on policy coordination.
Can a system of …xed exchange rates survive a crisis that puts into ques-
tion its viability as a policy coordinating mechanism? The answer to this
question depends on two considerations. First, in the light of the crisis,
private agents may modify their priors about the likelihood of future co-
operative behavior in the policy game. The levels of wages and domestic
interest rates vary with the market’s perception of the nature of the ongoing
game among policy makers. Therefore, the post-crisis …xed exchange rate
system may be intrinsically more or less fragile, depending on the perceived
changes in the nature of the game.
Second, as a result of a crisis, policy makers may form coalitions, that is,
new agreements among subsets of the players replace the old agreement. For
example, a subset of a few Periphery countries may either join an enlarged
Center or form a unilateral …xed exchange rate area vis-à-vis the Center (the
Core) which systematically excludes the others Periphery countries. The
emergence of such coalitions might be more plausible if there is some ex-
ante heterogeneity among the Periphery countries. Through the mechanisms
analyzed in the discussion of the Nash allocation, the stability of the bilateral
exchange rates in the Core vis-a-vis an IS shock in the Center clearly bene…ts
from the free ‡oat of the Core vis-à-vis the outsiders’ currencies.
9 Interpreting the ERM crisis in a Center-
Periphery model
The Center-Periphery model shows that, for a given exogenous shock to the
conventional fundamentals, represented by ², the equilibrium outcome is not
independent of the nature and extent of policy coordination in the Periphery
of the system. The goal of this section is to explore the contribution of this
insight to an understanding of the 92-93 exchange rate crisis.
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9.1 The realignment of the lira as a coordination shock
At the end of 1991, it became clear that, in the absence of a realignment
in the ERM, the Bundesbank would pursue the goal of price stability by
using its interest rate instruments with little regard for the consequences
for the domestic real economy and with utter disregard for the international
implications of such a policy. Figure 1 provides a striking synthesis of the
policy con‡ict between Germany and the other ERM members. The interest
rate in Germany increases relentlessly up to the crisis.
This con‡ict, reinforced by the tensions generated by the …rst Danish
referendum and the dollar crisis in August, had led, during the summer of
1992, to expectations of a generalized devaluation vis-à-vis the D-Mark, by a
magnitude that was variable across country (Italy, Spain and Portugal show
the highest interest di¤erentials) but modest overall, and signi…cantly smaller
than the magnitudes of the depreciations that were actually realized in the
following weeks. In the …rst half of September, a massive speculative attack
against the lira took place. Both the adverse cyclical conditions and the
increasing public debt to GDP ratio suggested that the Italian government
would have welcomed a devaluation. Unless the Bundesbank had stood deci-
sively in defense of the existing parities, a realignment was widely considered
unavoidable.
The speculative attack against the lira intensi…ed after the EC meeting
in Bath on the 5th and 6th of September, on which occasion the con‡ict on
exchange rate matters among European policy makers was widely reported
by the press. During the week following the event, the Bundesbank and the
Bank of Italy put forward a proposal for a generalized realignment involving a
3.5% revaluation of the D-mark and a 3.5% devaluation of the lira against all
other currencies in the ERM (that is, a 7% devaluation of the lira against the
D-mark). The realignment should have been matched by a cut in the German
interest rates by a magnitude that was to depend on the number of countries
joining in the realignment as well as on the size of these realignments.
At …rst sight, the German proposal may look like a bargaining scheme,
with the Bundesbank o¤ering a substantial interest rate cut in exchange
for a generalized devaluation of the ERM currencies vis-à-vis the D-mark.
Our model shows how misleading such an interpretation can be. The Ger-
man proposal need involve no bargaining or compromise. A decrease in the
community-wide interest rate following a generalized realignment is an equi-
librium (endogenous) outcome in our model, in which there is no bargaining
and the Center (Germany) does not modify its non-cooperative policy strat-
egy vis-à-vis the Periphery. There need not be any quid pro quo involved.
As Germany after reuni…cation was unwilling to modify its policy mix, the
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only way in which the rest of the Community could rescue their economies
from the adverse domestic implications of high German interest rates was
to engineer domestic monetary expansions and depreciate their currencies.
This could have been done in a coordinated way, for instance (but not nec-
essarily) along the lines of the German-Italian proposal. In principle, the
realignment scheme could have also involved di¤erentiated rates of exchange
rate devaluation, to account for heterogeneity among individual Periphery
countries.
Note that, according to our analysis, the initial and solitary Italian deval-
uation by 7% could hardly have been considered to be part of a sustainable
equilibrium. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Bundesbank pro-
posal could indeed have produced a sustainable ERM-wide parity grid, the
devaluation of the lira by 7% would have made sense only in the context of
a generalized realignment. As the lira was the only currency to be devalued
in a period of rampant rumors and leaks about disagreements and polemics
among ERM member countries,42 the new parity grid established in Sep-
tember 14th 1992 could have hardly been convincing in the eye of …nancial
markets.
In the light of these considerations, one should not dismiss the hypoth-
esis that the realignment of the lira on September 14, 1992 was indeed an
important component of the shock to the ERM fundamentals, insofar as it
conveyed information about a possible change in the rules of the ERM mon-
etary policy game (a switch from cooperative to non-cooperative behavior)
and thus led private markets to revise their views on the current and future
level of EC-wide interest rates.
With the …rst Italian devaluation it became apparent that German rates
would only fall signi…cantly in response to sharp devaluations by a number of
other countries. Our model shows that uncoordinated realignments deliver
less monetary expansion than coordinated realignments, even if all of the
devaluations that characterize the new Nash equilibrium are implemented
fully. A fortiori, the uncoordinated realignment(s) of a disequilibrium sce-
nario will deliver rather little system-wide monetary relaxation. Thus, the
partial resolution of the uncertainty about the degree of cohesion among the
ERM countries clearly pointed to a persistence of relatively high interest
rates. Doubts about the sustainability of such a regime must have suddenly
grown stronger in quite a few countries. As Padoa-Schioppa [1994] puts it:
”[the cause of the ERM crisis] was plainly traceable to what in
the academic jargon is called a ’co-ordination failure’ [...]. There
was the refusal to accept a general realignment and even to call
a meeting of the Monetary Committee or of the ministers and
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central-bank governors when, in September 1992, a general re-
alignment might have calmed the markets. The general proce-
dure, once embarked on, did not produce a credible new grid. At
various time, and in various ways, through unhelpful declarations
that excited markets as well as through policy decisions that caused
unnecessary friction, the system was destabilized by its very cus-
todians.”43
9.2 Policy options in Europe and scenarios for the 92-
93 crisis
Anecdotal evidence of a low level of cohesion and coordination in the face
of the tensions in the ERM in 1992 is overwhelming. It …rst became public
knowledge with the devaluation of the lira. Why were European countries
unable to agree on coordinated policy action?
At a theoretical level, our model addresses this issue by focusing on po-
tential con‡icts regarding the distributional consequences of a coordinated
realignment. A devaluation by one country has a positive external e¤ect on
welfare in the rest of the Periphery. There is scope for disagreement and
con‡ict about how the costs and bene…ts of coordinated policies are to be
distributed among the members of an exchange rate system.
Taking our model at face value, let us focus on the scenario in which, faced
with a sizable shock to German demand, symmetric coordination would lead
to a generalized defense of the exchange rate regime, while Nash behavior
would bring about uncoordinated devaluations by some countries. The …rst
bit of relevant evidence is that Germany was keen on implementing a gen-
eralized ERM realignment, while being utterly opposed to any revision of
its own monetary policy. The second bit of evidence is that apparently no
country (with the exception of Italy) was willing to discuss the terms of an
ERM-wide realignment, while considerable pressure was put on Germany to
do exactly what it did not want to do. In the EC meeting of Bath at the
beginning of September 1992
“Schlesinger was not so much ignored as scorned, says a partic-
ipant [to the EC meeting in Bath], for his apparent willingness
to ‘so easily put monetary union at risk’ with the …rst ERM re-
alignment since 1987. [...] ‘Realignment was a dirty word in
Bath’ Schlesinger was later bitterly to complain to a German col-
league.” 44
As it became absolutely clear that Germany would not give in to the
other ERM countries’ request to loosen its monetary policy, there were two
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possible courses of action open to the Periphery countries. The …rst one
was to engage in a possibly very painful defense of the existing parities, at
the cost of further domestic de‡ation and worsening …scal imbalances. The
second one was to engineer some monetary expansion in the Periphery. This
could have been achieved either in a coordinated way (implying bargaining
and compromising on whether, and by how much, each particular country
should have devalued), or, in the spirit of the brightest libertarian tradition,
“each one to his own”.
In the second scenario, the question arises as to which countries would
have to give in and devalue. Besides the lira, a reasonable set included the
pound, the peseta and the escudo. Note that, as far as the French franc is
concerned, the uncertainty regarding the political support for the Maastricht
Treaty played a role in delaying the speculative attack on this currency until
after the referendum result – a tiny majority for the oui to Maastricht.
Perhaps, there was no need at all to guess which particular currency would
have been more vulnerable to a speculative attack. Our model predicts that a
non-coordinated equilibrium requires a few countries to devalue by a sizable
amount; it cannot predict which currencies will be devalued. Thus, each
currency is a potential candidate for a devaluation, regardless of how sound
its domestic fundamentals look. The rest of the story is well known: during
the …rst ten days of the crisis, the lira and the pound withdrew from the ERM,
the peseta devalued by 5%, the defense of the French franc required massive
intervention by both French and German authorities and Spain, Portugal and
Ireland reintroduced temporary capital controls. In the following months,
several ERM currencies su¤ered repeated attacks.45 Substantial devaluations
were often the only possible response.
We stress two caveats. The …rst one regards the de…nition of the Center
of the system. This, of course, may include more than one country, pro-
vided that their monetary policies are fully coordinated. This is the case
for Germany, the Netherlands and, to a certain extent, Belgium. The sec-
ond caveat concerns the evidence of a coalition or cooperative arrangement
between Germany and France. France clearly cannot, for the period under
consideration, be considered part of the (hard) Center. Yet, unlike all other
Periphery countries, which were e¤ectively left to fend for themselves, France
bene…ted in the defense of its parity from massive German support, putting
it in the special position of belonging to the extended Center or “soft Core”
of the system.
With the exception of France, the survival of the ERM was clearly linked,
once the crisis had started, to each individual country’s willingness to peg its
exchange rate to the D-Mark, with little or no intra-community support. The
di¢culty of this task was magni…ed by a widespread feeling that the strength
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of the political support for Maastricht had somehow dwindled with the …rst
Danish referendum. From September 1992 till August 1993, the working of
the ERM is well described in terms of uncoordinated attempts to determine
the new equilibrium exchange rates, that is, by the (somewhat messy and
staggered implementation of the) Nash scenario of our model.
10 The road ahead
In the mid 1990s, we have witnessed something of a shift of support, within
both the political and intellectual milieu, from external to internal nomi-
nal anchors. It appears rather hard to …nd the same enthusiasm for …xed
exchange rate policies that characterized the late 1980s. As a new chapter
of European monetary history is being written, the academic debate on its
theoretical underpinnings has indeed been increasingly devoted to in‡ation
targeting, optimal contracts and central bank independence, with reduced
emphasis on target zones and other forms of exchange rate management as
stabilization instruments, reputation-building schemes and anti-in‡ationary
devices. The crucial turning point a¤ecting intellectual opinions and policy
priorities is the crisis of the ERM in 1992/93.
Still, to consider the ERM crisis as the ultimate proof of the unsustain-
ability (or undesirability) of …xed exchange rates is to miss the point. This
paper has developed in detail the view that the key event that triggered the
collapse of the ERM was a shift in the attitude toward exchange rate and
monetary policy coordination and cooperation among European policy mak-
ers, and the perception of this shift by market participants. With most of
the existing literature, we share the view that — unless the commitment to
the exchange rate peg is indeed completely unquestioned — the oxymoron-
like “‡exible peg” is in itself destabilizing, and contains the seeds of its own
destruction. We do not believe, however, that if a collapse can occur it nec-
essarily will occur. Asymmetric disturbances per se need not be disruptive
of international monetary arrangements. Almost by de…nition, a crisis of
an exchange rate system is a symptom of insu¢cient or ine¤ective policy
coordination.
As regards the implications for the future of the ERM and EMU, what
the 1992-93 events have painfully revealed is the intrinsic fragility of the
European monetary architecture. What should replace the current (non-)
system? The Center is currently showing an uncompromising attitude to-
wards monetary stability in a monetary union. The traditional debate be-
tween the “monetarist” and “economist” approach46 to European monetary
issues has long made us aware of the fact that, for the Center (the home of
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the ‘economist’ approach), the ‘convergence’ process is virtually a goal in its
own right, rather than a means to the end of monetary union. The transition
towards monetary union, rather than monetary union itself, is the crux of
the process. Note that any convergence-centered approach to the transition
to monetary union re‡ects a view of monetary union as a coming together of
countries that are e¤ectively replicas of each other rather than as a process
of integration of heterogeneous economies. The particular further slant given
to this approach by the Center in addition makes the convergence process
asymmetric, with the state of monetary union to be reached through the ad-
dition of homogenized Periphery regions to a pre-existing core on the terms
of the core. The statements of German …scal and monetary authorities in
the fall of 1995 leave no doubt about their stance on these issues.
Is it possible to replace e¤ective and active policy coordination among
European countries with the kind of mechanical policy coordination that is
implicitly required by numerical ceilings on public sector debts and by targets
for in‡ation rates, exchange rates and interest rates? Despite the well-known
objections to the logic and e¤ectiveness of the Maastricht convergence cri-
teria, such tests of good macroeconomic behavior may be useful in fostering
good policy management, provided that they are applied sensibly and ‡ex-
ibly. After all, solvency, low in‡ation and …nancial stability are reasonable
pre-requisites for a country that wants to join a monetary union. An obses-
sively mechanical reading of the Maastricht criteria, however, tends to focus
the attention exclusively on domestic problems, denying the relevance of the
issue of reconstructing a system of European monetary cooperation.
One key lesson from the 1992-93 crisis is that, in the absence of e¤ec-
tive internalization of the policy spillovers, nominal or real macroeconomic
convergence between Center and Periphery do not insulate the system from
currency crises. Even if a country were able to satisfy the Maastricht criteria
exactly, it could still be vulnerable to speculative attacks. Moreover, recent
episodes show that, without cooperation, countries that attempt to achieve
convergence may …nd themselves subjected to the …nancial equivalent of the
tortures of Tantalus. There are plenty of …nancial shocks beyond the control
of a national policy maker that may hamper convergence; careless politi-
cal statements by in‡uential foreigners are a good example. Through their
impact on interest rates, speculative pressures generated by a throwaway
comment or an infelicitously timed opinion in Frankfurt can rapidly reduce
the e¤ectiveness of domestic policy measures in Rome.
Finally, it is apparent that monetary union, if and when it comes, will
initially involve but a strict subset of all EU members. A whole range of
Center-Periphery (and intra-Periphery) issues will therefore have to be dealt
with. Even though the special problems associated with a two-speed or multi-
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speed monetary union are only transitional or temporary, in nature, no one
doubts they are likely to be acute. The year 1995 has already given us a taste
of the tensions that are likely to arise. We have mentioned before the debate
on the “unfair” competitive advantage acquired by weak-currency countries
against strong-currency countries as a result of the large devaluations since
September 1992. The suggestion was even made that these “competitive de-
valuations” sanctioned the imposition of countervailing duties within the EU.
Rebutted forcefully by several economists (including the EU Commissioner
Mario Monti) as inconsistent with the Single Market legislation, the case for
“devaluation aid” and compensatory transfers failed to convince the econo-
mists and the o¢cials of the Commission, who in the fall of 1995 concluded
that, if anything, strong-currency countries such as France, the Benelux and
Germany had gained in competitiveness through low in‡ation, lower interest
rates and low labor costs.
In historical perspective, political cohesion has been the engine of progress
in European economic and monetary integration. Political cohesion is what
has traditionally overcome the skepticism of markets as well as the objections
of the “experts”. The insu¢cient and solitary realignment of the lira in 1992
revealed to both markets and experts that European policy makers were no
longer able or willing to give a coherent, coordinated response to monetary
tensions. A renewed ability to do so will be the …rst important indicator
that the Maastricht design has not been swept away on waves of speculative
frenzy.
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Appendix
This appendix presents the structure of the model underlying our analysis.
All variables other than interest rates are in natural logarithms. All variables
referring to the Center country are starred, while the Periphery countries are
indexed with a subscript i, for i = 1; 2; :::; N. Unless otherwise explicitly
stated, Greek letters (both lowercase and uppercase) refer to constant, posi-
tive parameters.
A) The Center country Output supply in the Center, denoted by
y¤, is a deterministic function of employment, n¤, subject to decreasing re-
turns to scale:
y¤t = (1 ¡ ®)n¤t 0 < ® < 1 (A.1)
Labor is supplied inelastically, while pro…t-maximizing competitive …rms
equate the marginal product of labor to the real wage. The money wage
in the Center is denoted w¤, while p¤ is the Center’s GDP de‡ator:
w¤t ¡ p¤t = ¡®n¤t (A.2)
Real aggregate demand in the Center depends on the e¤ective real ex-
change rate of the Periphery vis-à-vis the Center z (de…ned below), the
Center’s real interest rate r¤, and an aggregate demand shock ¸¤:
y¤t = ¸
¤
t ¡ ±zt ¡ ºr¤t (A.3)
The real interest rate in the Center is its nominal interest rate i¤ minus the
expected proportional rate of change in its consumer price index, q¤ :
r¤t ´ i¤t ¡Etq¤t+1 + q¤t (A.4)
where Et denotes the expectation operator conditional on information avail-
able in period t.
The Center’s consumer price index is de…ned as follows. Let si;t be the
nominal spot exchange rate of the ith Periphery country (expressed as ith
country’s currency per unit of Center’s currency) and let st be the nominal
e¤ective exchange rate of the Periphery vis-à-vis the Center, that is,
st ´ 1N
NX
i=1
si;t (A.5)
Given the assumption of symmetry, in eqn.(A.5), the e¤ective nominal ex-
change rate is simply the arithmetic average of the nominal exchange rates
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in the Periphery. Similarly, let pi;t be the GDP de‡ator of the ith Periphery
country (in local currency). The real exchange rate of the Periphery country
i vis-à-vis the Center is de…ned as
zi;t = si;t ¡ pi;t + p¤t (A.6)
The e¤ective real exchange rate of the Periphery vis-à-vis the Center, z, is
then given by
zt ´ 1N
NX
i=1
zi;t (A.7)
It is convenient to de…ne ~pt the “e¤ective price level” of the Periphery as
a whole, measured in the Center’s currency, that is,
~pt ´ 1N
NX
i=1
(pi;t ¡ si;t) (A.8)
Assuming a constant share of imports in consumption, ¯ (which applies to
each of the Periphery countries as well as to the Center), the Center’s CPI
is de…ned as follows
q¤t ´ (1 ¡ ¯)p¤t + ¯ ~pt = p¤t ¡ ¯zt 0 < ¯ < 12 (A.9)
We restrict the propensity to import ¯ to be less than one half, which is
equivalent to assuming home bias in consumption in our model. As will
become clear later, this assumption rules out the possibility that real interest
di¤erentials and real expected depreciation between Center and Periphery
move in opposite directions.
Assuming a constant velocity money demand function, equilibrium in the
money market requires
m¤t = p
¤
t + y
¤
t = w
¤
t + n
¤
t (A.10)
where m¤ denotes the Center’s nominal money stock. At the end of period
t¡ 1, that is before the Center money stock m¤t is determined and observed,
wage setters choose the money wage prevailing in period t. Their objective
function is to minimize the forecasted deviation of employment from the
full-employment level (here normalized to zero). Therefore, they solve
min
w¤t
Et¡1
1
2
(n¤t )
2 (A.11)
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subject to eqn.(A.10). Since n¤t =m¤t ¡ w¤t ; this implies that nominal wages
are equal to the expected money supply, and employment (or output) is
function only of monetary innovations:
w¤t = Et¡1m
¤
t (A.12)
n¤t = m
¤
t ¡ Et¡1m¤t (A.13)
B) The Periphery countries Periphery countries have the same tech-
nology as the Center. Thus, using self-explanatory notation, the supply-side
equations characterizing the Periphery are given below.
yi;t = (1 ¡ ®)ni;t (A.14)
wi;t ¡ pi;t = ¡®ni;t (A.15)
We assume that Periphery countries import (export) goods and services ex-
clusively from (to) the Center country. This is the reason why only the
bilateral real exchange rate of country i relative to the Center, zi, enters into
the demand equation for country i0s output:
yi;t = ¸ + ±zi;t ¡ ºri;t (A.16)
Di¤erent from the demand equation in the Center country (A.3), the
parameter ¸ in equation (A.16) is constant. In other words, we abstract
from country-speci…c and time-speci…c IS shocks hitting the Periphery coun-
tries. The only source of exogenous uncertainty is therefore a perturbation of
aggregate demand in the Center, which a¤ects all Periphery countries sym-
metrically. The other behavioral parameters ±; º and ¯ are identical in both
the Center and the Periphery.
Real interest and exchange rates in the ith country are
ri;t = ii;t ¡ Etqi;t+1 + qi;t (A.17)
qi;t = pi;t + ¯zi;t (A.18)
By analogy with the Center, real money balances, money wages and employ-
ment in the Periphery are determined as follows
mi;t ¡ pi;t = yi;t (A.19)
wi;t = Et¡1mi;t (A.20)
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ni;t =mi;t ¡ Et¡1mi;t (A.21)
We …nally assume that assets denominated in di¤erent currencies are
perfect substitutes in private agents’ portfolios, so that the uncovered interest
parity condition holds:
ii;t = i¤t + Etsi;t+1 ¡ si;t (A.22)
Note that, given (A.22), with perfect capital mobility the uncovered interest
parity condition must hold for any pair of currencies in the system.
C) Shocks to fundamentals, monetary innovations and the real
exchange rate In this section, we present a semi-reduced form of our
model, expressing all endogenous variables as functions exclusively of exoge-
nous, predetermined or control variables. First, consider the bilateral real
interest rate di¤erential between the ith country and the Center country
ri;t = r¤t ¡ ¯(Etzt+1 ¡ zt) + (1 ¡ ¯)(Etzi;t+1 ¡ zi;t) (A.23)
By taking the sum over the N periphery countries, the average interest rate
di¤erential between the Periphery and the Center will beP
i ri;t
N
= r¤t + (1 ¡ 2¯)(Etzt+1 ¡ zt) (A.24)
According to the previous expression, the real interest rate di¤erential and
the expected rate of depreciation of the real exchange rate between Center
and Periphery move in the same direction if and only if ¯ < 1=2, that is,
if there is home bias in consumption (see eqn.(A.9)). We maintain this
assumption throughout.
A few intermediate steps are helpful to characterize the reduced form
equation for the Center’s e¤ective real exchange rate. First, using eqn.(A.24)
together with the aggregate demand functions (A.3) and (A.16), and the
resource constraint of the economy as a whole,P
i yi;t
N
¡ y¤t = (1 ¡ ®)
µP
i ni;t
N
¡ n¤t
¶
(A.25)
we obtain a …rst order stochastic di¤erence equation in zt:
zt = °Etzt+1 + Á
µP
i ni;t
N
¡ n¤t
¶
¡
Ã
°
º(1 ¡ 2¯)
!
(¸¡ ¸¤t ) (A.26)
where
° ´ v(1 ¡ 2¯)
2± + v(1 ¡ 2¯) < 1 Á ´
1 ¡ ®
2± + v(1 ¡ 2¯) (A.27)
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As the e¤ective real exchange rate zt is a forward looking variable, we im-
pose a no-bubble terminal condition. Solving equation (A.26) with such a
boundary condition yields
zt = Á
µP
i ni;t
N
¡ n¤t
¶
+ ²t (A.28)
where ²t is de…ned as
²t ´ °v(1 ¡ 2¯)
1X
¿=0
°¿Et(¸¤t+¿ ¡ ¸) (A.29)
The e¤ective real exchange rate depends both on the di¤erence between
the current monetary innovations in the Periphery and in the Center (which
equals the di¤erence between the employment levels in the Periphery and
the Center) and, through the forward looking variable ²t, on current and
expected future real demand shocks in the Center relative to the Periphery.
Thus, a demand (IS) shock in the Center larger than in the Periphery causes
the Center’s real exchange rate to appreciate, while a money supply shock
in the Center larger than in the Periphery causes the Center’s real exchange
rate to depreciate. The stochastic variable ²t is the exogenous shock to
the fundamentals of our international economy. It bears emphasizing that
the current realization of ²t is the present discounted value of current and
expected future demand disturbances over the in…nite horizon.
D) Bilateral real exchange rates and real interest rates Next,
it is straightforward (albeit algebraically tedious) to show that the bilateral
real exchange rate of Periphery country i vis-à-vis the Center is
zi;t = » (1 ¡ µ)ni;t +
0@²t ¡ »µX
j 6=i
nj;t ¡ Án¤t
1A (A.30)
where the parameters µ and » are de…ned as
µ ´
Ã
±¡ º¯
2± + º(1 ¡ 2¯)
!
1
N
; » ´ 1 ¡ ®
± + º(1 ¡ ¯) =
Á
1 ¡Nµ > 0 (A.31)
Note that the sign of µ is ambiguous.
Using (A.16) and (A.30), the semi-reduced form of the real interest rate
in country i becomes
ri;t =
1
º
8<:¸ + [±» (1 ¡ µ) ¡ (1 ¡®)]ni;t + ±
0@²t ¡ »µX
j 6=i
nj;t ¡ Án¤t
1A9=;
(A.32)
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Inspection of equation (A.32) brings out an important feature of our frame-
work: for given monetary policies in the rest of the system, n¤t and
P
j 6=i nj;t,
the spillovers from a positive demand shock in the Center result in an in-
crease of the real interest rate in country i. That is to say, positive demand
shocks in the Center country directly translate into negative demand shocks
in the Periphery through their e¤ect on the real interest rate.
Finally, it is useful to write the semi-reduced form equations for the CPI
as
qi;t = [®+ ¯»(1 ¡ µ)]ni;t + wi;t + ¯
0@²t ¡ »µX
j 6=i
nj;t ¡ Án¤t
1A (A.33)
and the bilateral nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the Center as
si;t = [®+ » (1 ¡ µ)] ni;t +wi;t¡ w¤t ¡®n¤t +
0@²t ¡ »µX
j 6=i
nj;t ¡ Án¤t
1A (A.34)
Other things equal, a depreciation of its nominal exchange rate raises both
employment and the CPI in country i.
In the main text, we adopt the following notational simpli…cations:
®0 ´ ®+ ¯»(1 ¡ µ) (A.35)
®1 ´ »µ (A.36)
®2 ´ ®+ »(1 ¡ µ) (A.37)
Ài;t ´ ²t ¡®1 X
j 6=i
nj;t ¡ Án¤t (A.38)
It is therefore immediate to derive equations (1) and (2) in the main text by
rearranging equations (A.33) and (A.34) above.
E) Equilibrium devaluation thresholds To determine the devalua-
tion thresholds, we proceed as follows. First, we write the formula for the
shadow devaluation rate as:
¢~si;t =
¹ni + (A ¡¤)wi;t + (A¡ ¯¤) Ài;t + ¤¹qi;t ¡ A¹si;t
A
(A.39)
where
A =
1 + ¾®20
®2
¤ = ¾®0: (A.40)
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Second, market participants’ wage expectations can be rewritten by rear-
ranging eqn.(20) as a function of a given threshold¹Ài;t
wi;t = Et¡1mi;t = (1 ¡ ¼i;t)A
Ã
si;t ¡ [EÀi;tjÀi;t <¹Ài;t]
(1 ¡ ¼i;t)A+ ¼i;t¤
!
+
+¼i;t
Ã
¹ni +¤ (¹qi;t ¡ ¯ [EÀi;tjÀi;t ¸¹Ài;t])
(1 ¡ ¼i;t)A+ ¼i;t¤
!
(A.41)
Third, we replace wi;t in the de…nition of the shadow devaluation rate
¢~si;t with expression (A.41). Rearranging the realignment rule (18), country
i will devalue its currency if the following condition holds:Ã
A ¡ ¯¤
A
!
Ài;t +
"
¹ni +¤ (¹qi;t ¡ ¹si;t)
(1 ¡ ¼i;t)A+ ¼i;t¤
#
¡
¡
µA¡ ¤
A
¶"(1 ¡ ¼i;t)A [EÀi;tjÀi;t <¹Ài;t] + ¼i;t¤¯ [EÀi;tjÀi;t ¸¹Ài;t]
(1 ¡ ¼i;t)A+ ¼i;t¤
#
¸ ~ci
(A.42)
This is the key-expression to the endogenous identi…cation of the devalua-
tion threshold¹Ài;t; so far taken as a given parameter. The equilibrium in-
terior value(s) of the devaluation threshold under rational expectations can
be found by taking expression (A.42) to hold with equality and solving for
Ài;t =¹Ài;t:
F) Multi-country Nash equilibrium Our three-step solution strat-
egy focuses on equilibrium outcomes involving (possibly) devaluations by
some countries. First, conjecture the existence of a realization of the shock,
say ² = ²^, such that each Periphery country is indi¤erent between maintain-
ing the peg and abandoning it. By conditions (18), it is obvious that this is
possible if and only if the SDR — eqn.(A.39) above — is equal to ~c for each
country in the Periphery, when evaluated at ²^ :
¢~si [^²] = ~c i = 1;2; :::; N (A.43)
Given that the Periphery countries are indi¤erent between a peg and a ‡oat,
denote by NFL the number of countries that decide to realign. Since the
countries that choose to abandon the peg devalue (optimally) by a percentage
~c, the average actual depreciation rate is
1
N
NX
i=1
(si ¡ ¹s) = N
FL
N
¢~si [^²] =
NFL
N
~c (A.44)
56
Second, consider the aggregate reaction function of the Periphery, namelyP
i ni
N
=
1
®2
·P
i si
N
¡ ²¡
P
i wi
N
+ ®1 (N ¡ 1)
P
i ni
N
¸
(A.45)
Using eqn.(A.44), it is possible to evaluate the previous expression at ² = ²^.
Solving for the average employment rate in the Periphery yieldsP
i ni
N
(^²) =
1
®2 ¡ ®1 (N ¡ 1)
"
NFL
N
~c¡ ²^+
P
i (¹si ¡ wi)
N
#
(A.46)
Third, consider the shadow devaluation rate (A.39) and take its average
across Periphery countries. For our conjecture to be true, it must be the case
that P
i¢~si
N
(^²) = ~c =
1
A
·
¹n+ (A¡ ¤)
P
i wi
N
+
+ (A¡ ¯¤)
µ^
²¡ ®1 (N ¡ 1)
P
i ni
N
(^²)
¶
+¤
P
i ¹qi
N
¡ A
P
i ¹si
N
¸
(A.47)
where A and ¤ are the parameters de…ned in eqn.(A.40) above. Substituting
eqn.(A.46) into (A.47) and rearranging, the percentage of countries that in
equilibrium must abandon the peg is given by
NFL
N
=
1
~c-3
"
¹n+-1^² ¡ -2
NX
i=1
¹si ¡ wi
N
¡ ¤
NX
i=1
wi ¡ ¹qi
N
¡ A~c
#
(A.48)
where the -0s coe¢cients are functions of the parameters of the model, as
summarized below:
-1 =
®2 (A¡ ¯¤)
®2 ¡ ®1 (N ¡ 1) = (A¡ ¯¤)
Ã
1 +
»µ (N ¡ 1)
®+ Á
!
-2 = A+
®1
®2
(N ¡ 1)-1 -3 = -2 ¡ A (A.49)
The proportion of countries abandoning the peg in equilibrium is a linear
function of target exchange rate, the target price level, the predetermined
wage rates and the realization of the shock. As we conjectured, equation
(A.48) implies that each country is indeed indi¤erent between abandoning or
maintaining the announced exchange rate parity, provided that the required
number of countries NFL devalue in the aggregate (for expositional conve-
nience, we ignore the constraint that NFL be an integer). Note that, with
ex-ante identical countries, it is not possible to determine which particular
countries will implement a devaluation.
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Nonetheless, the range of shocks for which our conjecture is valid is lim-
ited by the fact that NFL must lie between 0 and the number of Periphery
countries. The boundaries of this range can thus be determined by setting
NFL = 0 and NFL = N in equation (A.48), and solving for the correspond-
ing threshold values, ²d and¹²d: For shocks larger than¹²d; all countries in
the Periphery will devalue by the same optimal rate ¢~si;t ¸ ~c. For shocks
smaller than¹²d; the Periphery countries will maintain the peg.
G) Cooperative equilibrium under the national horizontal eq-
uity constraint The optimal monetary policy in the case of coordinated
symmetric behavior of the N countries in the Periphery implies the following
reaction functions: if ¢~sCSi · ~cCS ,
ni =
¹si ¡ wi ¡ ²
®+ Á
(A.50)
while if ¢~sCSi ¸ ~cCS,
ni =
¹si +¢~sCSi ¡ wi ¡ ²t
®+ Á
: (A.51)
Under symmetric cooperation, the relevant shadow devaluation rate is
¢~sCSi =
1
ACS
h
¹n+
³
ACS ¡ ¯¤CS´ ² +ACS(wi ¡ ¹si) ¡ ¤CS (wi ¡ ¹qi)i
(A.52)
where
ACS ´ 1 + ¾(®+ ¯Á)
2
®+ Á
¤CS ´ ¾ (®+ ¯Á) (A.53)
Solving for the equilibrium yields the following condition: the Periphery
will jointly devalue for ² ¸ ¹²CS, and jointly maintain the peg for ² · ¹²CS .
The threshold of the shock at which a generalized devaluation occurs is easily
obtained as
¹²CS ´ A
CS~cCS ¡ ¹n¡ ACS(wi ¡ ¹si) + ¤CS (wi ¡ ¹qi)
ACS ¡ ¯¤CS (A.54)
58
Notes
1For a reconstruction and chronology of the ERM events see Kenen [1995],
ch.7, and Buiter, Corsetti and Pesenti [1996], ch.3.
2The standard references are Hamada [1976], Cooper [1985], Buiter and
Marston [1985] and Canzoneri and Henderson [1991]. Recent developments
are surveyed in Currie and Levine [1993], Ghosh and Masson [1994] and
Persson and Tabellini [1995].
3As Begg and Wyplosz [1993] write, “despite inconclusive formal evidence,
most students of the EMS have accepted the German dominance hypothesis.
The frequency of this conclusion seems to arise from the usual view that if
you don’t see what you believe then buy adequate glasses” (p.23).
4Among the most recent cases, it is worth recalling that in 1995 French
and Belgian industries – and a number of leading politicians from these two
countries – have been bitterly complaining about the competitive advantage
acquired by British, Italian and Spanish industry as a result of the large de-
valuations since September 1992. As an example, according to the estimates
(reported by the Financial Times, September 18, 1995) by Jacques Calvet,
head of Peugeot, for every 1 per cent fall in the value of the lira or sterling,
the company’s pre-tax pro…ts fell by between FFr35m and FFr140m.
5See e.g. Canzoneri and Henderson [1991].
6However, note that an increase in wages is directly in‡ationary but indi-
rectly de‡ationary, as it reduces employment and therefore domestic prices
along the short-run Phillips curve.
7See Appendix A and B.
8For future reference, the formula for ²t as the innovation to the present
discounted value of the demand shock is:
²t ´ °º(1 ¡ 2¯)
1X
¿=0
°¿Et(¸¤t+¿ ¡ ¸)
Here ¸¤t is the IS shock in the Center during period t, ¸ is the common value
of the IS ‘shock’ in the Periphery, and °; º and ¯ are positive parameters
with ¯ < 1=2 and ° < 1. See Appendix C for details.
9When we move from the partial-equilibrium approach considered so far to
general-equilibrium considerations, it should be clear that the policy stance
of every country in the system is jointly determined as a function of the
exogenous shock to fundamentals ²t.
10In choosing the policy target ¹qi;t and ¹si;t, the policy maker is aware of the
link between them: for a given value of the Center’s GDP de‡ator p¤t , …xing
¹qi;t and ¹si;t is equivalent to targeting some level of the real exchange rate. In
principle, one could use this fact to explore the implications of choosing an
“incorrect”, misaligned exchange rate target. However, in what follows we
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shall rather focus on the case where there is no inescapable con‡ict between
the objectives for the internal and the external value of the currency. The
country therefore targets ¹qi;t = ¹si;t + ¹p¤t :
11As we discuss below, ¹p¤t is a constant (normalized to zero) in our model.
12Indeed, most analyses of international monetary games, including our
own in Buiter, Corsetti and Pesenti [1995] and [1996], focus precisely on the
case in which the Center country targets the CPI and not the de‡ator.
13With predetermined wages, country j ’s GDP de‡ator increases with its
nominal money stock, but less than proportionally and its real output ex-
pands. The increase in aggregate demand that matches the increase in supply
requires a real depreciation and a fall of the real interest rate.
14In our model, all goods market interaction among the Periphery passes
through the Center. If the fall in the demand for the Center’s output is large
responding to a depreciation of country j ’s bilateral real exchange rate, for
a given domestic supply in the Center, the real interest rate will have to fall
substantially to clear the market for Center output. This decline in the real
interest rate is transmitted to the other Periphery countries. They now face
excess demand at their old bilateral real exchange rate with the Center and
will experience a real appreciation. Similar considerations apply also in the
more general case in which intra-Periphery trade is considered.
15The result depends on the relative size of the elasticities of aggregate
demand with respect to the real interest rate and the real exchange rate,
normalized by the (constant) share of income devoted to domestic consump-
tion.
16See for instance Frankel [1988] and Ghosh and Masson [1994], ch.2.
17In principle, the identi…cation of an optimal monetary policy is rather
di¢cult when the objective functional of the policy maker is de…ned over an
in…nite horizon. Nonetheless, in our setup the intertemporally optimal policy
is obtained by taking into account the single-period loss function `i;t only.
Among the features of our model which allow this considerable simpli…cation
of the analysis, note that current and anticipated future policy actions are
assumed not to be a¤ected by the past history of the game (that is, the actual
sequences of past policy actions).
18See Appendix E, eqn.(A.39).
19The constant can be shown to be equal to the square root of 2ci= (1 + ¾®20) :
20The escape clause speci…ed in our analysis does not preclude the possi-
bility of a revaluation of the central parity as well as of a devaluation. We
simplify the analysis by considering realizations of the shock for which the
relevant alternative for the country i’s policy makers is between a peg and a
devaluation against the Center. In other words, we restrict the support of the
shock to be such that a revaluation by country i will never be optimal, ruling
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out by construction shocks to fundamentals that would correspond to large
negative value of the shadow depreciation rate (so that ¢~si;t ¸ ¡~ci). The
extension to the general case is simply a corollary of the analysis to follow.
21See the discussion in Cavallari and Corsetti [1996].
22See also Obstfeld [1994].
23See the discussion in Eichengreen and Wyplosz [1993].
24See for instance Champa and Chang [1995] and Kenen, Mercurio and
Pesenti [1996].
25See, for instance, Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz [1994].
26Note that, on logical grounds, the fact that fundamentals do not seem
to di¤er before and after a currency crisis can be alternatively interpreted as
evidence against an interpretation based on self-ful…lling speculative attacks.
It is su¢ciently clear, at least since Obstfeld [1986], that multiple instanta-
neous equilibria are based on the policy maker validating ex-post the initial
private sector conjectures. To the extent that monetary and interest rate
policy is among the fundamentals, these should indeed di¤er after the crisis
in the presence of a successful self-ful…lling attack.
27For a discussion, see Gros and Thygesen [1992].
28In the reconstruction of Muehring [1992], “near the end of the conference
in the British spa town of Bath on Saturday, September 5, British Chancel-
lor of the Exchequer Norman Lamont asked Bundesbank president Helmut
Schlesinger once more for a commitment to cut German interest rates, which
could be included in the postmeeting communiqué. Schlesinger, containing his
mounting anger, replied that it was impossible. When Lamont continued to
press him, the normally un‡appable Bundesbank president suddenly stood up
to leave, only to be restrained by an almost equally annoyed Theo Waigel,
the German …nance minister. ‘My dear Norman, - Waigel snapped - you
have asked us that question four times, and four times we have given you
the same answer. We do not see the need for wasting any more time. So if
you ask again, I will get our helicopter ready to take us back’.” In private
conversation, Schlesinger recalls to have said: “The Bundesbank committee
decided the day before not to lower, but authorized me to say that we would
not increase”.
29In the case of France, one could nonetheless argue that the incipient loss
of competitiveness was suppressed through a high and rising unemployment
rate, which created doubts about the political sustainability of the franc fort
policy.
30Player j’s action, nj, is a strategic complement with respect to player i’s
action ni (i 6= j) if the magnitude of the optimal action of player i increases
whenever player j increases the magnitude of her action, that is, if and only
if @ni=@nj > 0 (see Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer [1985]): In the two-
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player case the reaction curve of player i would be upward-sloping. When
®1 is negative, then @ni=@nj < 0; country j’s action is instead a strategic
substitute with respect to country i’s action.
31It can be easily shown that @¢~si=@nj < 0 if ®1 > 0.
32Formally, the response of country i0s welfare to a monetary expansion in
country j conditional on both countries letting their currencies ‡oat can be
calculated by di¤erentiating country i0s loss function with respect to country
j 0s employment, and evaluating this expression at the equilibrium level of
employment and prices under a ‡oat:
@`FLi =@nj = ¡¾
³
qFLi ¡ ¹qi
´
¯®1
If the support of fundamentals shocks ² is such that revaluations are never
optimal, the Nash equilibrium price level will be above its target level ¹qi (and
Nash equilibrium employment will be below its target level ¹n). The expres-
sion above is therefore negative for large ² when ®1 is positive: a monetary
expansion in country j increases welfare in country i:
33Such assumption is obviously based on positive, not normative, consid-
erations.
34A discussion of the historical role of a (strong form of) national horizontal
equity is in De Cecco [1988]. The author focuses on the hypothesis according
to which cooperative actions are pursued only if they preserve the relative
positions, in terms of economic and political power, of the four main mem-
bers of the EMS. A general discussion of distributive issues and economic
integration is in Guerrieri and Padoan [1988].
35If the Periphery countries were not all equal ex-ante, this constraint could
be generalized to the requirement of “fair” outcomes (ex-post), such that no
Periphery country would tolerate a cooperative action that reduces its welfare
(relatively to other countries) below some predetermined level, unanimously
agreed upon.
36Note that the literature on EMU mainly discusses international transfers
in the framework of the theory of optimal currency areas. International trans-
fers contingent on relative aggregate demand can help reduce the short-run
cost of IS shocks due to domestic nominal rigidities in a …xed exchange rate
system, thus increasing the stability and viability of the system. At a theo-
retical level, our model highlights a di¤erent role of contingent international
transfers, as side-payments that could make asymmetric coordinated policies
feasible by compensating the countries that sustain the largest adjustment
costs in a realignment. While in principle sound, however, the assumption
of intra-Periphery side-payments of the kind required to support cooperation
with nationally di¤erentiated policy actions would hardly be defensible on
empirical grounds.
62
37The nearest we get to such exchange rate cooperation-contingent trans-
fers are the Monetary Compensatory Amounts (MCA’s) of the Common
Agricultural Policy. Even they don’t …t the bill, on closer inspection, as they
(a) are limited to the agricultural sector and (b) are not contingent on the
implementation of cooperative exchange rate policies, but simply respond to
gaps between the value of the Green currency and the value of the actual
currency, regardless of the nature of the exchange rate arrangements that
generates these gaps.
38See the discussion in Giavazzi and Giovannini [1989].
39In terms of the notation adopted in the Appendix, ~cCS is equal to the
square root of 2c (®+ Á) =ACS:
40Figure 6a shows the possibility that, for some con…guration of parameters
(implying a stronger in‡ationary bias than in Figure 6b), the trigger point
for a generalized devaluation under symmetric cooperation is lower than the
threshold at which at least one country realigns under Nash. In this case, a
cooperative agreement delivers less exchange rate stability for any level of the
shock in the Center. Policy makers will bene…t in this case from “smooth”
and frequent realignments (a familiar pattern during the early stages of the
ERM).
41This question of course points at political economy considerations, stress-
ing the role of policy makers’ changing attitudes towards the international
agreement.
42As Peter Kenen [1995] writes, “the Germans were apparently interested
in a more general realignment but pursued the matter rather casually —
too casually perhaps to impress the French with the urgency of the issue...
It may be objected that France would have vetoed a general realignment,
even if France had pressed for one, because the French believed that the
franc was immune to contagious speculation. What would have happened,
however, if the German chancellor had warned the French president that the
Bundesbank could not be expected to support the franc — if he had called
attention to the so-called Eminger letter. (One might also ask what would
have happened if the German chancellor, not the Italian prime minister,
had telephoned John Major about the devaluation of the lira — and added
the same sort of warning about future Bundesbank support for the pound)”
(p.160).
43Padoa-Schioppa [1994], p. 14-15.
44Muehring [1992], p. 7.
45Similar problems were also faced by both Scandinavian countries that
kept their currencies pegged against the mark, obviously not because of the
disappearance of faith in the willingness and ability of the ERM members
to cooperate in the defense of the peg, as no such (implicit) agreement to
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cooperate ever existed for them. Country-speci…c triggers were undoubtedly
part of the explanation (the collapse of its trading arrangements with the FSU
for Finland and the collapse of domestic consumption demand for Sweden).
Bandwagon and contagion e¤ects may also bear some of the blame.
46In the intellectual history of European monetary integration, two schools
of thought have been contrasted with each other, at least since the time of the
Werner Report. The …rst one advocates gradualism in the implementation
of the institutional reforms and in the change of policy regimes. Gradu-
alism here means that the process of integration is primarily a process of
convergence of economic structure and performance in di¤erent countries, to
be matched, and indeed followed by, appropriate institutional developments.
The second school instead stresses the role of institutional innovations in
promoting economic integration, and advocates …xed deadlines and uncondi-
tional institutional reforms which would lead and encourage the behavioral
changes required for convergence. Perhaps with little semantic justi…cation,
supporters of the …rst school are traditionally labelled “economists”, as op-
posed to the “monetarists” populating the rival intellectual habitat.
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